It is an opinion worth reading. In very short, the Court held that a border search of a cellphone must be limited in scope to a search for contraband, not evidence of a border-crime.
The opinion's introduction provides a good summary:
[W]e conclude that manual cell phone searches may be conducted by border officials without reasonable suspicion but that forensic cell phone searches require reasonable suspicion. We clarify Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. We further conclude that cell phone searches at the border, whether manual or forensic, must be limited in scope to a search for digital contraband. In this case, the officials violated the Fourth Amendment when their warrantless searches exceeded the permissible scope of a border search. Accordingly, we hold that most of the evidence from the searches of Cano’s cell phone should have been suppressed.
The Court also explained: "where the individual suspected of committing the border-related crime has already been arrested, there is no reason why border officials cannot obtain a warrant before conducting their forensic search."
Finally, the Court rejected the government's reliance on the good faith exception, with very helpful language:
"We have said that the good faith exception applies only to searches where “binding appellate precedent . . . ‘specifically authorizes’ the police’s search.” It is not sufficient for the question to be “unclear” or for the government’s position to be “plausibly . . . permissible.”
"We understand that border officials might have thought that their actions were reasonable, and we recognize that border officials have to make in-the-moment decisions about how to conduct their business—whether or not they have written guidance from the courts. But as we understand the Davis rule, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies only when the officials have relied on “binding appellate precedent.” This is a rapidly developing area, not an area of settled law. Even if our decision in Cotterman rendered the searches “plausibly . . . permissible,” it did not “specifically authorize” the cell phone searches at issue here."
Next, United States v. Crum, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-30261 (9th Cir. 2018), is a frustrating decision that essentially acknowledges it is wrongly decided based on prior precedent with which the panel disagrees.
The Court held that Oregon Revised Statutes § 475.890 qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). But as Judge Watford's dissent points out, in fact, the Oregon offense is overbroad, because a mere offer to sell does not constitute solicitation of a “controlled substance offense.”
