2/21/18: SCOTUS decides that a guilty plea does not bar the defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal.

In Class v. United States, --- U.S. ---, No. 16-424 (2018), the question was whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal.

The Court held it did not.  Rather, because the issues raised "challenge the Government’s power to criminalize Class’ (admitted) conduct" and "thereby call into question the Government’s power to 'constitutionally prosecute' him," Class could pursue those claims on appeal, despite his guilty plea.

 It is important to note, however, the plea agreement in the case did not contain an express waiver of constitutional claims.

2/20/18: Interesting case on when a federal sentence begins to run for a defendant initially in state custody

In Johnson v. Gill, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-16400 (9th Cir. 2018), a divided panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ determination of when the petitioner's federal sentence commenced.

While serving his state sentence, the petitioner was twice erroneously turned over to federal authorities. The state credited the time the petitioner spent in federal custody against his state sentence. Once his state sentence was finally complete, the USMS took him into federal custody.

The BOP concluded the petitioner's federal sentence commenced, only after the USMS took him into custody the final time.   

The majority of the panel agreed.  Here are the key quotes. 

under § 3585(a), “[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date” that the federal government has primary jurisdiction over a defendant who is “received in custody awaiting transportation to” the official detention facility. 

It is well established that if a sovereign takes a defendant into its custody before another sovereign has done so, then the arresting sovereign establishes its primary jurisdiction and may give effect to its sentence before other sovereigns may do so.  

A sovereign’s priority terminates when the sentence expires, charges are dismissed, or the prisoner is allowed to go free. 

The more difficult situation arises when one sovereign transfers a defendant to another sovereign. Such a case requires an exercise of comity between the sovereigns, and turns on whether the state with primary jurisdiction intended to surrender its priority upon transfer or merely transferred temporary control of the defendant to the federal government.  

Because a state’s transfer of temporary control of the defendant “extends no further than it is intended to extend,”  and a state that mistakenly transferred a prisoner to the federal government lacked the intent to surrender primary jurisdiction, such a mistaken transfer does not constitute a relinquishment of primary jurisdiction. If the state retains primary jurisdiction, the federal sentence does not commence pursuant to § 3585. Therefore, a prisoner’s federal sentence does not commence when the state mistakenly transfers a prisoner to the federal government.

Although I personally think the dissent had the better argument, this is the law for now. 

2/5/18: Good jury waiver case

In United States v. Laney, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-10563 (9th Cir. 2018), the defendants did not personally sign the jury waiver, prior to trial.  As a result, the Ninth Circuit vacated their convictions.

The Court held, "that the proper practice under Rule 23(a) is for the defendant to personally execute the written waiver; a written stipulation signed by defense counsel alone—like the stipulations at issue in this case—will not raise a presumption of validity."

The Court clarified, however, "the absence of a defendant’s signature will not constitute reversible error if the record otherwise shows that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent."

But becuase the record did not satisfy that standard, and because an invalid jury waiver is structural error, the Court sent the case back for a new trial. 

1/2/18: Helpful ACCA decision

In United States v. Walton, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-50358 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel vacated the defendant's sentence, imposed under ACCA, because his prior convictions for robbery in Alabama and California did not qualify as "violent felony" predicates.

The Court bases is conclusion on a straightforward categorical approach in the context of the Supreme Court's requirement under Johnson that the “physical force” required under ACCA’s force clause must be “violent force” or “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”

Because neither the Alabama nor California priors required that level of force, they do not qualify under ACCA.