Tuesday, August 13, 2019

8/13/19: Personal money judgments in criminal case & more on sentencing reductions

Two cases today.

First, in United States v. Nejad, --- F.3d ---, No. 30082 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court affirmed the district court’s entry of a “personal money judgment” against the defendant.

This is a criminal forfeiture issue.  In short, when the proceeds of a crime are not available, the government is allowed to seek substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). 

In this case, the Court held the government can obtain a personal money judgment to satisfy a substitute-property forfeiture order.  But:

"it is clear that personal money judgments must be enforced within the constraints imposed by the applicable criminal forfeiture statutes.. .when § 853(p) applies, the government may not enforce a personal money judgment through the same means it would use to enforce an ordinary in personam civil judgment. Instead, once the government identifies untainted property that it believes may be used to satisfy a personal money judgment, it must return to the district court and establish that the requirements of § 853(p) have been met.

"If the court concludes that those requirements have been satisfied, the court may then amend the forfeiture order to include the newly identified substitute property. Only when these procedures are followed may the government satisfy a personal money judgment from the defendant’s untainted assets."

Next, in United States v. Hernandez-Martinez, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-30309 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motions for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

Based on existing precedent, the Court approved the district court's conclusion that the defendants were categorically ineligible for resentencing in light of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), which generally prohibits a sentence reduction if the original term of imprisonment is below the lower end of the amended Guidelines range.   In other words, because the defendants' original sentences were below the low-end of the amended range, they were not entitled to resentencing.