In Stokeling v. United States, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-5554 (2019), the Court addressed the definition of "physical force" in ACCA. It concluded: "'physical force,' or 'force capable of causing
physical pain or injury,' Johnson, 559 U. S., at 140, includes the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance. Robbery under Florida law corresponds
to that level of force and therefore qualifies as a 'violent
felony' under ACCA’s elements clause."
As the dissent points out, after Johnson, we thought we knew what force was required under ACCA's elements clause: "This Court’s decision in Johnson tells us that when
Congress wrote the words “physical force” in the context of
a statute targeting “violent felon[ies],” it eschewed the
common-law meaning of those words and instead required
a higher degree of force."
The majority, however, adopted a different construction. Again, as the dissent notes, under the Florida robbery statute, "[i]f the resistance is minimal, the force need only be minimal as
well." Thus, under the majority's rule, even the most minimal force can qualify: "The Government concedes, similarly, that a thief
who grabs a bag from a victim’s shoulder also commits
Florida robbery, so long as the victim instinctively holds
on to the bag’s strap for a moment." This understanding of "force" is contrary to Johnson. But it is now the law.
This will likely have a substantial impact, given the implications for other statutes (e.g. 18 USC 16(a)) that contain similar language.
