Today brings the first published reversals.
First, in United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-30158 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court vacated the defendant's illegal reentry sentence. The Court concluded the defendant's prior Washington state conviction for cocaine possession did not constitute a "felony" under 2L1.2.
This is an important decision because it changes our understanding of the definition of a felony under 2L1.2 The Guidelines define "felony" as "any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added).
The Court determined that, although the defendant’s Washington conviction carried a general statutory maximum term of imprisonment of five years, under the Washington statutes that prescribe a binding sentencing range, the actual maximum term that the defendant could have received was six months. As such, the conviction did not qualify as a "felony."
In other words, instead of looking just at the maximum authorized term, the inquiry must focus on what the defendant could actually have received under state law.
"In sum, the Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime’s statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment. Here, we are called on to decide whether Defendant’s earlier offense was punishable under Washington law by more than one year, and we can no longer follow our earlier precedents that eschewed consideration of mandatory sentencing factors. As noted, Washington statutes prescribe a required sentencing range that binds the sentencing court. The sentencing range can be modified, or rendered inapplicable altogether, if but only if the judge or the jury makes certain factual findings. In this case, no such finding was made, so the court was bound to adhere to the statutory sentencing range. Defendant’s offense—as actually prosecuted and adjudicated—was punishable under Washington law by no more than six months in prison. The district court therefore erred by concluding that his offense was punishable by more than one year in prison."
Second, in United States v. Lopez, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-10261 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court vacated the defendant's convictions for false statement during
the purchase of a firearm, aggravated identity theft, and felon
in possession of a firearm.
The defendant pursued a duress defense, arguing she bought the gun because she was too scared to say no to her boyfriend. In support of that defense, she sought to introduce expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome. The district court excluded the evidence.
The Ninth Circuit reversed:
"[W]e are persuaded that expert testimony on
how BWS can cause individuals to become hypervigilant to
impending harm does not . . . seek
to alter the duress defense’s reasonable-person standard. The question is still whether or not 'a
person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant’s] situation
would have been unable to resist.'"
"We acknowledge . . . that the “‘snapshot’ of circumstances” shown to the
jury is not limited to just those circumstances existing
immediately prior to the commission of the crime. This court has long recognized that a
defendant’s particular situation includes consideration of past
experiences."
"Moreover, BWS evidence is compatible with assessing
whether a defendant had a reasonable opportunity to escape
from the coercing party. As seen above, this inquiry often
focuses on why the defendant did not call the police at the
first opportunity."
"[E]xpert testimony on BWS serves an important role in
helping dispel many of the misconceptions regarding women
in abusive relationships. Such evidence was vital to Lopez’s
defense, which hinged on persuading the jury that she acted
only out of an objectively reasonable fear."
Additionally, the Ninth gives us this reminder: "We have cautioned, however, 'that the exclusion of evidence offered by the defendant in a criminal
prosecution under Rule 403 is ‘an extraordinary remedy to be used
sparingly.'"
