First, in United States v. Landeros, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-10217 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court reversed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop.
The Court held that law enforcement officers may not extend a
lawfully initiated vehicle stop because a passenger refuses to
identify himself, absent reasonable suspicion that the
individual has committed a criminal offense.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (holding that an officer may not prolong a stop, absent
the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual), partially abrogated the Ninth Circuit's prior decision in United
States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).
As to the facts, "the officers insisted several times
that Landeros identify himself after he initially refused, and
detained him while making those demands. At the time they
did so, the officers had no reasonable suspicion that Landeros had committed an offense. Accordingly, the police
could not lawfully order him to identify himself."
The Court further noted "Landeros also refused to comply with the officers’
commands to leave the car. Police officers may order a
suspect out of a car during a traffic stop. The Supreme Court has
extended that rule to passengers detained during a lawful
stop. But here, the
stop was no longer lawful by the time the officers ordered
Landeros to leave the car, as it had extended longer than
justified by either the suspected traffic violation or any
offense as to which there was independent reasonable
suspicion. As Officer
Baker had, before Landeros was ordered from the car,
impermissibly extended the stop based on Landeros’s refusal
to identify himself, the validity or not of the exit order
standing alone does not matter."
Second, in United States v. Hall, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-10422 (9th Cir. 2019), the district court imposed a special condition of supervised release restricting the defendant's relationship with his son (and codefendant) Benton.
The condition provided that he was “permitted to have contact
with Benton [] only for normal familial relations but is
prohibited from any contact, discussion, or communication
concerning financial or investment matters except matters
limited to defendant’s own support.”
The defendant objected at
sentencing that the condition is unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit agreed, and struck the offending words “only for normal
familial relations” from the condition.
It explained, "[t]he phrase 'normal familial relations' is susceptible to
many different interpretations, and so raises questions with
no clear answers. Must relations be 'normal' for that
particular family, or “normal” for families in general? If the
latter, as the government contended at oral argument, how is
a defendant to know what a 'normal' family is and does, in
light of the tremendous diversity of family structures and
family habits, customs, and activities in this country?
