In United States v. Chapman, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-4939 (9th Cir. 2026), the Court vacated John Chapman’s conviction for kidnapping resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and remanded for a new trial.
First, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chapman’s post-verdict motion for acquittal, holding that (1) the “holding” element of the federal kidnapping statute does not require a use of physical force, and an individual may be “held” against their will through a means of deception in an inveiglement case; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Chapman “held” the victim by nonphysical forms of “holding,” including deception.
The Court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Chapman's motion to suppress his confession, holding that he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession was voluntary.
The Court, however, agreed with the parties that the district court improperly coerced the verdict.
[T]he district court’s interactions with the jury were undoubtedly coercive. First, the district court did not disclose to the parties the jury’s two substantive notes received by the district court on the first day of deliberations. These notes contained the numerical breakdown of the jurors’ votes, a fact that was not told to the parties.We have previously held that giving an Allen charge while knowing the numerical breakdown of the jury’s votes is “per se coercive and requires reversal.”The district court knew the breakdown of jurors’ votes from the jury notes it received on the first day, yet the district court did not disclose these substantive notes to the parties before the district court gave its Allen charge. The notes were not disclosed until after the verdict was reached. This was impermissible jury coercion.Second, the district court’s comments when canvassing Juror Number 11 were coercive under the “totality of the circumstances.” “[T]he form of the instruction” was coercive because the district court explicitly told Juror Number 11 to “surrender that opinion,” that the evidence on which Juror Number 11 was relying was “irrelevant,” and that the evidence Juror Number 11 was considering “doesn’t matter.” We have previously held that directing a jury to focus on certain portions of evidence is coercive, just as is disparaging or minimizing evidence that a juror says they are relying upon.“[T]he time the jury deliberated after receiving the charge” also favors a finding of coercion. After being deadlocked for two days during deliberations, the jury spent only thirty-seven minutes deliberating after the district court’s charge before swiftly returning with a unanimous guilty verdict. We have repeatedly held that a short time frame for deliberations after an Allen charge indicates coercion. Here, deliberation for only thirty-seven minutes after the Allen charge was given fits comfortably within the range of durations considered coercive in our precedent
