Today brings two SCOTUS decisions limiting the circumstances that qualify as “extraordinary and compelling" under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
First, in Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ---, No. 24-556 (2026), a divided Court held that "[t]he compassionate release provision is not a vehicle for attacking the validity of a conviction."
Petitioner Joe Fernandez argues that doubts about a conviction’s validity also qualify as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for relief under the statute. We disagree. A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582.The heartland “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that might warrant an early release from prison—age, illness, a child left with no guardian—bear no resemblance to the grounds for relief under §2255. Fernandez cannot deploy §3582 to blunt what he perceives to be the sharp edges of §2255.
Next, in Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ---, No. 24-820 (2026), the Court considered "whether the sentencing disparity created by Congress’s nonretroactive change to §924(c)’s mandatory penalties can serve as an 'extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]' that “warrant[s]' a reduction. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i)." The majority held that it cannot.
The compassionate release provision empowers a district court to “reduce the term of imprisonment” if it finds, among other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Ibid. The term “extraordinary” means “most unusual,” “far from common,” or “having little or no precedent.” Putting these definitions together, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release are those that are especially unusual and convincing.The disparity created by Congress’s amendment to §924(c) does not satisfy this definition. Far from “extraordinary,” nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm.We need not decide whether there are reasons beyond personal circumstances that could qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” Until very recently, no one thought that nonretroactive sentencing amendments were among them.They are not.
