In United States v. Taylor, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-1244 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court affirmed the 60-month sentence imposed upon revocation of Douglas Taylor’s supervised release.
The Court explained that a district court imposing a modification or revocation of a term of supervised release may not punish the defendant for the original crime of conviction. Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2040 (2025). Moreover, a court may not punish a defendant who has violated the terms of supervised release by engaging in criminal conduct. See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the court may consider a violation of criminal law underlying the supervised release violation in its evaluation of the criminal history of the defendant, the risk of recidivism, and the violator’s breach of the court’s trust.
Taylor argues that the district court improperly punished Taylor for his August 2008 conduct under Miqbel and Simtob, by stating that his conduct was “egregious.” We disagree. Unlike in Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1183, the court did not improperly cite § 3553(a)(2)(A) in stating the reasons for its sentence. Rather, the court considered the appropriate factors, including that Taylor had violated the terms and conditions of supervised release, see § 3553(a)(1) (requiring the court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”), and that Taylor had not responded to sanctions or attempted interventions, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring consideration of “adequate deterrence”). Read in context, the court’s statement that Taylor had “engaged in egregious conduct that is a danger not only to himself but to the public” is consistent with § 3553(a)(2)(C), which requires the court to consider the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” As Simtob allows, the district court considered Taylor’s criminal history, the “similar[ity] to [Taylor’s] past transgressions,” and Taylor’s “propensity for recidivism and inability to integrate peacefully into a community.” 485 F.3d at 1062. Moreover, the court noted that Taylor violated the court’s trust and was unable to integrate peacefully back into the community. See Esteras, 145 S. Ct. at 2040 n.5 (taking “no position on whether this is a permissible consideration.”).The district court thus “properly look[ed] to and consider[ed] the conduct underlying the revocation as one of many acts contributing to the severity of” Taylor’s breach of trust, so as to fully understand Taylor’s history and risk of recidivism. Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1063. The district court did not discuss retribution or punishment for Taylor’s violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Thus, the district court did not procedurally err on this ground, much less plainly err.In sum, the district court did not commit plain procedural error by considering Taylor’s circumstances and arguments and imposing a 60-month above-Guidelines sentence at the revocation sentencing hearing.
