Two criminal decisions today.
First, in United States v. Vlha, --- F.4th ---, No. 22-5028 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court affirmed James Vlha’s and Travis Schlotterbeck’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) for conspiring to manufacture firearms for sale without a federal license and Schlotterbeck’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) for selling a firearm to a felon.
The issue on appeal was whether these two statutes violate the Second Amendment. The Court held they do not.
Defendants James Vlha and Travis Schlotterbeck were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) for conspiring to manufacture firearms for sale without a federal license and Schlotterbeck was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) for selling a firearm to a felon. Defendants argue that these two statutes violate the Second Amendment. We disagree because the Second Amendment does not apply to Defendants’ conduct.Where the challenger is an individual whose direct possessory right to “keep and bear Arms” is not implicated, as here, our ancillary-rights doctrine applies. Before Bruen, we held that the Second Amendment protects some activities ancillary to the core possessory right, including the ability to acquire weapons. E.g., Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 676–78. But the Second Amendment is limited in this context: it protects ancillary activities only if the regulation of such activities “meaningfully constrain[s]” the core individual possessory right. Id. at 680. There is not “a freestanding right” to sell firearms that is “wholly detached from any customer’s ability to acquire firearms.” Id. at 682; see also id. 682–90 (analyzing the history). A vendor challenging a firearms regulation must be able to demonstrate that the would-be purchasers’ core right of possession is being meaningfully constrained. See id. at 678, 681–90.Bruen did not abrogate our ancillary-rights doctrine. Thus, we apply the meaningful-constraint test at step one of the Bruen analysis to determine whether the conduct at issue is presumptively protected by the Second Amendment.Federal law prohibits manufacturing firearms for public sale or distribution without a license. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).1 And because Defendants are not asserting possessory rights, whether the Second Amendment protects their unlicensed manufacture of firearms is governed by the ancillary-rights doctrine.Broadly speaking, we agree with Defendants that the ability to manufacture firearms facilitates individuals’ ability to buy firearms, which facilitates the core right to “keep and bear Arms.” See Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 677 (holding the “core Second Amendment right . . . ‘wouldn’t mean much’ without the ability to acquire arms” But federal law does not prohibit manufacturing, only manufacturing “as a regular course of trade or business” without a license. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(21)(A), 922(a)(1)(A). The licensing scheme that Congress created here is not discretionary—the required license must be issued if the applicant pays a filing fee, is at least 21-years old, has premises on which to conduct his business, and is generally compliant with other laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(a), (d); see also 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.41–478.60.Given this, requiring commercial firearm manufacturers to obtain licenses under the shall-issue scheme challenged here does not meaningfully constrain would-be purchasers from obtaining firearms. See Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 680–81. While “any permitting scheme can be put toward abusive ends” through “lengthy wait times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees” and the like, Bruen, 587 U.S. at 38 n.9, Defendants have not shown any such abuse here. Therefore, we conclude that the text of the Second Amendment does not cover the conduct regulated by § 922(a)(1)(A), and Defendants’ constitutional challenge as to this statute fails.
The Court also held that because "felons have no Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, then it necessarily follows that they have no right to purchase firearms." Thus, "Schlotterbeck’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(d)(1) also fail."
Next, in United States v. Bejar-Guizar, --- F.4th ---, 23-3201 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court affirmed Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar’s conviction for unlawful entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).
On a densely foggy early morning in the Imperial Beach area of San Diego, U.S. Border Patrol agents spotted a man walking along a divided highway. The agents noticed that the man had muddy legs and boots—as if he had just crossed the Tijuana River by the border. He was walking on the side of the highway with no sidewalk, about 300 yards north of the U.S.-Mexico border, at a time when most nearby stores were still closed. One of the agents stopped the man, later identified as Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar, for an immigration inspection. He admitted that he was here unlawfully.
Bejar-Guizar contended that Border Patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him under the Fourth Amendment. The Court disagreed.
Bejar-Guizar also argued that his admissions that he was in the United States unlawfully were not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence under the doctrine of corpus delicti. The Court again disagreed, holding that circumstantial and other evidence established both Bejar-Guizar’s alienage and the trustworthiness of his admissions.
