In United States v. Bryant, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-3039 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Donnie Bryant’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
When he was sixteen, Donnie Bryant participated in a gang-related shooting for which he was sentenced to 70 years’ imprisonment. Decades later, he moved for compassionate release, arguing that his youth at the time of his offense is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because youth does not qualify as “extraordinary and compelling” under § 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, we affirm.This appeal raises three questions, all with the same answer. Is a defendant’s youth at the time of his offense an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release? No. How about a sentencing disparity with a codefendant? Also no. And were Bryant’s § 924(c) convictions “stacked” in violation of the First Step Act? No again.Start with youth. 2 Section 1B1.13 defines “extraordinary and compelling” in several subsections. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(5). Because § 1B1.13 now binds 2 The Government argues that Bryant did not properly raise the youth issue in his compassionate release motion. We disagree. The motion consistently framed Bryant’s juvenile status as an independent reason for a reduced sentence. defendant-filed motions, see supra, at 6, we must decide whether any of its subsections can be read to encompass a defendant’s youth. If not, then youth cannot satisfy the first condition for compassionate release. See Wright, 46 F.4th at 945 (citing § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).[T]he only way youth can qualify as extraordinary and compelling is through subsection (b)(5): the “Other USA V. BRYANT 11 Reasons” provision. Subsection (b)(5) is narrow. It only covers a “circumstance or combination of circumstances” that is “similar in gravity” to those described above. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). The question, then, is whether a defendant’s youth at the time of his offense is “similar in gravity” to the other circumstances in § 1B1.13. Id.We think not. The circumstances in § 1B1.13 address situations where continued incarceration risks a defendant’s health or safety, § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(2), (4), or would severely burden third parties unable to care for themselves, § 1B1.13(b)(3). That a defendant was a minor when he committed his crime—which, in many cases, occurred years or even decades ago—does not raise similar concerns.That does not mean, however, that youth can never be considered in ruling on a motion for compassionate release. As the preceding discussion shows, the fact that a defendant was a minor at the time of his offense can be considered when weighing the § 3553(a) factors at the third step of the compassionate release analysis. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (considerations include the “history and characteristics of the defendant”). The third step is where district courts consider facts that existed at sentencing. But youth is not an extraordinary and compelling reason at step one, which focuses instead on developments that occur after a defendant USA V. BRYANT 13 has been sentenced. So long as a defendant identifies an extraordinary and compelling reason that fits within § 1B1.13’s binding framework, a district court could decide under § 3553(a) that a defendant’s youth is another factor supporting compassionate release. The statute allows for that possibility.What the statute does not allow is contorting the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons requirement to convert compassionate release into an “unbounded resentencing” mechanism. Hunter, 12 F.4th at 570. In enacting § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress did not authorize district courts to take a second bite at the sentencing apple. Rather, compassionate release is a limited, discretionary exception to the default rule that a federal defendant will serve his entire sentence. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010). Next is Bryant’s argument based on the 35-year disparity between his sentence and that of his codefendant, Toliver. Like Bryant, Toliver was sentenced on several VICAR and § 924(c) counts. Years later, Toliver was resentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment based on an agreement in which he pleaded guilty to a different firearm count. So while Toliver and Bryant were convicted for offenses arising out of the same incident, Toliver’s final judgment and corresponding sentence are different.Toliver’s sentence is not 35 years shorter than Bryant’s because he benefited from changes in the law; his sentence was reduced in exchange for pleading guilty. Toliver’s cooperation is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for Bryant’s release.Finally, we turn to Bryant’s contention that his sentence was impermissibly “stacked” as to his § 924(c) convictions, and that this is an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Bryant’s argument rests on a false premise: he is not serving a “stacked” sentence.Bryant, a first-time § 924(c) offender, did not receive a stacked sentence for his three § 924(c) convictions. Because he discharged a firearm, each of those convictions came with a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which, by law, must run consecutively, id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). The district court treated each violation as a first offense, thus imposing a 30-year sentence with ten years on each count. Bryant never received the 25- year enhanced sentence for a “second or subsequent” conviction. So Bryant’s sentence does not implicate the First Step Act’s revisions to § 924(c).A defendant’s youth at the time of his offense is not “extraordinary and compelling” under § 1B1.13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Nor is a sentencing disparity that stems from a codefendant’s guilty plea. And we do not credit Bryant’s novel conception of § 924(c) stacking.
