In United States v. Steinman, --- F.4th ---, No. 23-1703 (9th Cir. 2025), on a government appeal, the Court reversed the district court’s order suppressing evidence seized from Steinman’s car following a traffic stop in a case in which Steinman was charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition and possession of unregistered firearms.
Below are some of the key points:
The Government challenges the district court’s order granting Steinman’s motion to suppress on multiple bases. First, the Government argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that Trooper Boyer unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop without the requisite reasonable suspicion, in part because it improperly considered Trooper Boyer’s subjective motivation. Second, the Government contends that the district court erred in concluding that Trooper Boyer lacked probable cause to seize Steinman’s BMW.Steinman disagrees with the Government on those two points and further insists that because the Government failed to challenge the district court’s ruling that the search warrant was overbroad—an “independent basis for suppression”— we must uphold the suppression order. In response to this additional argument, the Government insists that the overbreadth of the warrant is immaterial because Trooper Boyer had probable cause to believe that the BMW contained evidence of a crime, so it could be searched without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.We agree with the Government on all three points, and we reverse the suppression order.The district court concluded that the fruits of the traffic stop could be suppressed because Trooper Boyer unconstitutionally extended the traffic stop without the requisite reasonable suspicion. This was error.In short, if a traffic stop is constitutionally justified at its inception—which is not seriously disputed in this appeal— our analysis is twofold. Was the stop prolonged, and, if so, was the prolongation justified by reasonable suspicion based on the information available at that juncture?Applying these rules here, we conclude that Steinman’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by an unconstitutional prolongation of the traffic stop. Our conclusion flows from two key premises. First, nothing up until the point when Trooper Boyer finished reviewing Steinman’s criminal history and learned that he had a felony conviction (approximately 4:08pm according to the body-camera footage) constituted an unconstitutional prolongation of the traffic stop. All of the actions taken by Trooper Boyer up until that point either (1) were within the legitimate mission of the traffic stop, including protecting officer safety or (2) did not prolong the traffic stop. Second, after Trooper Boyer reviewed the criminal history and learned that Steinman had a felony conviction, he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Steinman was engaged in criminal activity—namely, that Steinman possessed firearms in violation of Nevada law. Thus, even if we assume that Trooper Boyer did prolong the stop at some point after he learned that Steinman had a felony conviction, it is of no moment because he was entitled to do so based on his reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.First, it did not prolong the stop for Trooper Boyer to ask Steinman to exit the BMW and come with him to the patrol car. It is black-letter law that a trooper may do so in the interest of officer safety.[E]ven assuming that Steinman is correct that some of Trooper Boyer’s questioning during the relevant period fell outside the purview of the traffic-stop mission, Trooper Boyer did not violate Steinman’s Fourth Amendment rights. Again, “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention.”To the extent that Steinman argues that simultaneous questioning or discussion inherently slows down the citation-writing process—and thus extends traffic stops— because it is distracting and reduces the capacity of officers to work diligently, we are unpersuaded. Police officers are not automatons required to work with the maximum possible efficiency at all costs. Nor are they required to sit in stony silence like school children taking an exam during the process of filling out a traffic citation.In sum, because Trooper Boyer’s arguably investigatory questioning occurred simultaneously with tasks that fell within the mission of the traffic stop—viz., filling out the citation form and requesting and reviewing a criminal history records check—we cannot say that the questioning measurably prolonged the stop. Thus, it does not implicate Steinman’s Fourth Amendment rights.Even assuming arguendo that Trooper Boyer deviated from the traffic-stop mission to conduct an independent investigation after he finished reviewing the criminal history check, an independent investigation was justified because Trooper Boyer had reasonable suspicion that Steinman was engaged in criminal activity. Put otherwise, “even if,” after the initial criminal history-check, Trooper Boyer “prolonged the encounter beyond the original mission of the traffic stop, [he] had a sufficient basis to do so”—namely, reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.After Trooper Boyer had viewed Steinman’s criminal history report, he had (1) observed an ammunition box in Steinman’s vehicle; (2) observed a blanket covering a number of items in the back seat; (3) heard Steinman’s arguably evasive answer about what was under the blanket; (4) observed furtive movements by Steinman in the BMW; (5) heard Steinman’s admission that there was ammunition (though not guns) in the vehicle; and (6) learned that Steinman had felony convictions. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this was sufficient to give Trooper Boyer reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to investigate whether Steinman had firearms in the vehicle in violation of Nevada law.In sum, the district court’s decision that there was an unconstitutional prolongation of the traffic stop was erroneous. Trooper Boyer did not prolong the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment by any of the actions that he took up through the point where he reviewed the criminal history check, at around 4:08 p.m. And even if there was prolongation after that point, Trooper Boyer had reasonable suspicion that Steinman had committed an independent criminal offense in violation of Nevada law, so he could deviate from the traffic stop to investigate that offense.The district court also suppressed the fruits of the search on the ground that there was no probable cause for Trooper Boyer to seize Steinman’s BMW. Reviewing the probable cause determination de novo, see Guerrero, 47 F.4th at 984, we disagree. The information available to Trooper Boyer would have given him probable cause to believe that the BMW contained (1) evidence that Steinman possessed ammunition in violation of federal law and (2) evidence that Steinman possessed firearms in violation of state law. Accordingly, Trooper Boyer could seize the BMW, and suppression was not warranted on this basis.The warrantless towing of Steinman’s car qualifies as a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). “Because warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, the government bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012).Here, all parties agree that, in order to seize the BMW, Trooper Boyer must have had probable cause that the BMW contained evidence of a crime. This is derived from the “‘automobile exception’” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “under which a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted ‘if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.’”We first address whether Trooper Boyer could seize the BMW because he had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a federal crime—namely, that Steinman possessed ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).Steinman contends that Trooper Boyer, a state law enforcement officer, “had no basis to seize the car for a potential federal law violation.” The parties agree that possession of ammunition is only prohibited by federal law and is not a crime under Nevada law.Steinman says that the seizure of the BMW cannot be retroactively justified on the grounds that a state law enforcement officer suspected that there was evidence of a federal crime when that same conduct was not unlawful under state law.Whether state officers can rely on suspected violations of federal law in justifying a search or seizure is an issue that our court has never squarely addressed. And it is a question that has divided the few courts that have addressed it.In simple terms, the question at issue is “whether an officer employed by one government can justify a search or seizure based on a violation of a different government’s law.” Id. at 474. This has been called the issue of “cross-enforcement” of the Fourth Amendment.After considering the arguments raised by both parties, we agree with the Government that the fact that possession of ammunition by a felon is illegal only under federal law poses no barrier to Trooper Boyer’s seizure of the BMW.[W]e conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, Trooper Boyer could seize Steinman’s BMW because he had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a federal crime (namely, possession of ammunition by a felon), even though that same conduct was not criminalized under Nevada law.[E]ven if we were to agree with Steinman on this point (which we do not), the seizure of the BMW was nevertheless constitutional because there was probable cause to believe that Steinman had violated Nevada law by possessing firearms as a felon.We find it particularly salient that the BMW contained an ammunition box in plain view. Indeed, we have found the presence of ammunition (or other indicia of firearm ownership) on a defendant’s person to be highly important in the probable-cause analysis.As a panel of our court cogently articulated, “[b]ullets strongly suggest the presence of a gun.” Although that statement was made in an unpublished—and thus nonprecedential—case, we firmly agree with that common-sense sentiment.In sum, the district court erred in concluding that there was not probable cause to seize (and search) the BMW on the ground that it contained evidence that (1) Steinman was violating federal law by possessing ammunition and (2) Steinman was violating Nevada law by possessing firearms. Thus, Trooper Boyer did not violate Steinman’s Fourth Amendment rights in seizing his BMW.Finally, Steinman also argues that even if the district court did err in concluding that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged and the seizure was not justified by probable cause, we should still affirm the district court’s suppression order because of warrant overbreadth. According to Steinman, the district court reasoned that warrant overbreadth was an independent ground for suppression, and the Government has failed to challenge this ruling on appeal.We agree with Steinman that the Government has waived any challenge to overbreadth and that the district court saw warrant overbreadth as an independent basis for exclusion. 12 Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we accept the proposition that the search warrant was overbroad and thus could not justify a search of Steinman’s automobile. But we disagree with Steinman that this overbreadth requires suppression of the evidence found in the automobile.Instead, we agree with the Government that the overbreadth of the warrant is ultimately immaterial because a warrantless search of the BMW was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.Thus, notwithstanding the overbreadth of the warrant, the fruits of the search of Steinman’s BMW—namely, the guns and ammunition—need not be suppressed if the search could have been justified pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Such a justification is present in this case. As indicated above, Trooper Boyer had probable cause to search and seize the BMW without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because he had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of violations of both federal and state law. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569– 70; Faagai, 869 F.3d at 1150. And the automobile exception may apply even if the automobile has been towed back to the police station or elsewhere. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 570; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52 (1970); Scott, 705 F.3d at 417. Thus, the fruits of the search need not be suppressed.
