3/21/25: Two SCOTUS decisions today

Beginning with Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. ---, No. 23-1095 (2025), the Court held that 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.

Chief Justice Roberts' opinion is very well written and worth the read.  Here are some key points. 

Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from the same bank. Later, Thompson told the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed . . . $110,000” from the bank. Thompson was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the FDIC. Thompson argued that his statements were not false because he had in fact taken out a loan for $110,000 just as he said. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that they did not need to consider that argument. In their view, the prohibition in §1014 against “false statement[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and Thompson’s statements were at least misleading in failing to mention the additional loans. The question presented is whether §1014 criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false. 

We start with the text. Section 1014 criminalizes “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report.” It does not use the word “misleading.” Yet false and misleading are two different things. A misleading statement can be true. And a true statement is obviously not false. So basic logic dictates that at least some misleading statements are not false.

Given that some misleading statements are also true, it is significant that the statute uses only the word “false.” If that word means anything, it means “not true,” both today and in 1948 when the statute was enacted. Just as a matter of plain text, then, a statement that is misleading but true is by definition not a “false statement.”

Adding “any” before “false statement” does not change that result. Contra, Brief for United States 19–20. Certainly, “any” has an “expansive meaning.”  But “[e]xpansive, yes; transformative, no.”

The Government wisely agrees that “false” means “not true.” Brief for United States 14. But, dictionary in hand, the Government notes that “false” can also mean “deceitful.” And, thesaurus in the other hand, the Government adds that “false and misleading have long been considered synonyms.” Absent from the Government’s account, however, is the fact that some misleading statements are not false, as the Government acknowledged at oral argument. Given that fact, the Government’s textual arguments simply point out the “substantial overlap” between the two terms. That overlap is beside the point. Certainly, the statute’s prohibition on “false statement[s]” could reach some statements that are “mislead[ing],” “deceitful,” “deceptive,” or “mendacious,” but only because those particular statements are also false. Regardless of whether other adjectives apply, the only relevant question according to the text of the statute is whether the statement is “false.” 

The Government argues that we should affirm on the alternative basis that Thompson’s statements were false. But neither the District Court nor the Seventh Circuit answered that question, and “we are a court of review, not of first view.” Our holding shows, however, that this question is the right one to ask under §1014. And as the litigation before us has clarified, even Thompson agrees that “[c]ontext obviously matters in determining whether a statement is false.”  

We agree with the parties that at least some context is relevant to determining whether a statement is false under §1014. We leave for remand the question whether a reasonable jury could find that Thompson’s statements in this case were false. 

In casual conversation, people use many overlapping words to describe shady statements: false, misleading, dishonest, deceptive, literally true, and more. Only one of those words appears in the statute. Section 1014 does not criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Under the statute, it is not enough that a statement is misleading. It must be “false.”

Next in Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. ---, No. 23-825 (2025), the Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).  

Title 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” to include a felony that involves the “use of physical force” against another person. In the context of a closely related statute, we have held that “the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 169 (2014). This case asks whether that principle extends to §924(c)(3)(A) and, if so, whether the principle holds in cases where an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than action. We answer both questions in the affirmative. 

This Court applies a “categorical approach” to determine whether an offense falls within the elements clause. Under that approach, we do not examine the defendant’s actual conduct. Instead, we ask whether the offense in question “always” involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. Ibid. If the offense can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause. 

The Second Circuit correctly held that causing bodily harm by omission requires the use of force. As in Castleman, the “use” of “physical force” in §924(c) encompasses the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury. There is no exception to this principle when an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than affirmative act. Delligatti’s §924(c) challenge therefore fails. 

Look for the government to rely on this holding to argue that inaction or passivity qualify as "use" in other contexts.