In United States v. Ramirez, --- F.3d ---, No. 18-10429 (9th Cir. 2020), a divided panel reversed the denial of the defendant's suppression motion.
This is an important case worth reading. Here's the intro:
"This appeal concerns the Fourth Amendment’s limits on the government’s use of deceit when executing a valid search warrant."
"[Agents] obtained a warrant to search the residence of Stefan Ramirez and any vehicle registered to Ramirez located at or near the residence. Under the warrant and the law established by Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the agents had no authority to seize Ramirez or search his car when they arrived to execute the warrant, because neither was at the residence. The agents manufactured the authority to seize them by falsely claiming to be police officers responding to a burglary to lure Ramirez home. By luring Ramirez home, the agents’ successful deceit enabled them to obtain incriminating statements from Ramirez and evidence from his car and person. The district court denied Ramirez’s motion to suppress the statements and evidence, and Ramirez thereafter pleaded guilty to receipt and distribution of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors. We hold that, under the particular facts of this case, the agents’ use of deceit to seize and search Ramirez violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the suppression order and remand for further proceedings."
The majority continued: "Although the propriety of a ruse search or seizure depends on the particular facts of each case, our precedent draws a clear line between two categories of deception. Law enforcement’s use of deception is generally lawful when the chosen ruse hides the officer’s identity as law enforcement and facilitates a search or seizure that is within its lawful authority, such as pursuant to a valid search warrant. Deception is unlawful when the government makes its identity as law enforcement known to the target of the ruse and exploits the target’s trust and cooperation to conduct searches or seizures beyond that which is authorized by the warrant or other legal authority, such as probable cause."
"[W]hen the government agent is known to the suspect as such, and invokes the trust or cooperation of an individual to search or seize items outside what is lawfully authorized, such a ruse is unreasonable under Fourth Amendment."
"Law enforcement does not have carte blanche to use deception to effect a search and seizure. A ruse that reveals the officers’ identity as law enforcement but misrepresents the purpose of their investigation so that the officers can evade limitations on their authority raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns."
"[T]he ruse used here was not a permissible means to effect the search and seizure of Ramirez. The FBI agents posed as police officers and played on Ramirez’s trust and reliance on their story that his home had been burglarized to bring Ramirez and his car within the ambit of the warrant, when they were not otherwise within its ambit. The FBI had no acceptable government interest in using this ruse. Thus, balancing the strong Fourth Amendment interest against the non-existent government interest, the FBI’s conduct was plainly unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
"Balancing the Government’s justification for its actions against the intrusion into the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests, the Government’s conduct was clearly unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment interest is near its zenith in this case because the agents betrayed Ramirez’s trust in law enforcement in order to conduct searches and seizures beyond what they were lawfully authorized to do."
The Court also considered, "whether Ramirez’s statements, made after Agent Ratzlaff revealed the true purpose of the investigation and asked to speak with him, should be suppressed because they were tainted by the illegality of the initial seizure."
The majority held they should.
"[T]he Government failed to carry its burden to show that Ramirez’s incriminating statements were not obtained through 'exploitation of illegality'—the use of the ruse to circumvent the Summers rule and unlawfully seize Ramirez— rather than 'by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"
Judge Collins dissented.
