The principal issue revolved around the government's expert physician's testimony that the prescriptions were written “outside the usual course of medical practice” and “without a legitimate purpose.”
The defense argued the testimony amounted to a legal conclusion in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 702 and 704. The Ninth held otherwise.
We hold that if the terms used by an expert witness do not have a specialized meaning in law and do not represent an attempt to instruct the jury on the law, or how to apply the law to the facts of the case, the testimony is not an impermissible legal conclusion. See FED. R. EVID. 702(a), 704(a).
Here, expert testimony was needed to assist the jury. Dr. Chavez’s testimony was helpful because a lay jury would not have the requisite knowledge to evaluate whether the dosage, mix, and course of narcotics prescribed by Diaz were medically appropriate for the conditions being complained of by his patients. Dr. Chavez’s opinions were based on a review of the prescriptions for individual patients, and while he employed phrases that also appear in the elements of § 841(a)(1), such as “outside the usual course of medical practice” and “legitimate medical purpose,” these phrases were used in their ordinary, everyday sense and do not “have a separate, distinct and specialized” legal significance apart from common parlance, Dr. Chavez did not substitute his judgment for the jury’s; he provided a professional opinion about whether a course of conduct comported with the standard of care prevalent in the medical community.
Be wary of the prosecution trying to use this holding in other contexts.
