At first blush, the opinion is unremarkable. But then it turns to the discussion of mens rea.
The defendant argued that his prior conviction was not a categorical crime of violence because only negligence was required as to the element of placing the victim “in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out.”
The Court agreed that was true under Washington law, and agreed (as it must) "that a negligent application of force is insufficient to constitute a 'use of force' and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a crime of violence."
Nevertheless, if found a categorical match. How, you ask?
[B]ecause § 4B1.2(a)(1) only requires that the state crime has as “an element . . . the threatened use of physical force.” (emphasis added). It is clear that the first element of a conviction under § 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii)—a knowing threat of intent to kill someone—requires a sufficient mens rea, and so that element by itself may render the conviction a crime of violence. That other elements of the statute may be satisfied with a lower mens rea adds nothing to our inquiry[.]
In other words, so long as just one element of the prior requires a sufficient mens rea, it does not matter that the others require less.
Although this seems (to me) antithetical to the categorical approach, it is now the law.
The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that a threatened use of physical force must convey some prospect that the force could immediately occur. Thus, even indeterminate threats to kill in the distant future can constitute crimes of violence.
