In United States v. Gessen, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-2979 (9th Cir. 2026), the Court affirmed Allen Gessen’s conviction for murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958.
In the light most favorable to the government, the evidence suggested that Gessen agreed to pay $50,000 to a broker, who agreed to arrange to kill Priscilla Chigariro, the mother of Gessen’s children. However, the supposed broker was actually undercover FBI agent David Rizzo, who posed as a member of an organized crime syndicate.
Gessen’s proposed a jury "instruction aligned with his defense theory that murder-for-hire cannot exist between a real solicitor and a fictional intermediary, like an undercover FBI agent. But the district court correctly rejected the instruction because it is contrary to the requirements of § 1958."
We start with the text of § 1958. As relevant here, § 1958 requires that the defendant act “with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The statute says nothing about the intent of the other party or parties to the proposed murder transaction. Thus, Gessen’s argument is contrary to the explicit requirements of the statute and seeks to add an element that is not contained in the statute.Gessen asked the district court to instruct the jury that he could not be convicted without evidence of a “quid pro quo agreement.” His proposed instruction provided that “the defendant must have reached an agreement with a person who clearly understood that they themself would commit a murder in exchange for defendant’s promise to pay or payment of something of pecuniary value.” But an actual agreement is not required unless conspiracy is charged. Because Gessen’s requested instruction is unsupported by law, the district court did not err in rejecting it.
Gessen also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court held, "[f]rom the recorded conversations between Gessen and Rizzo, which the government played at trial, a rational jury could have concluded that Gessen intended to kill Chigariro—not have her deported."
Sufficient evidence also supports the jury’s finding that Gessen intended Chigariro’s murder to be committed in exchange for something of pecuniary value. The jury heard that, before the second meeting, Rizzo asked Gessen to bring “half the amount” of $50,000 for their “project.” Then, at the meeting itself, Gessen gave Rizzo a gold coin worth $2,000 and promised to wire the remainder to a business account in San Francisco. And after the meeting, Gessen wired about $23,000 to the FBI’s undercover bank account. A rational jury could thus conclude that Gessen intended to pay $50,000 in exchange for Chigariro’s murder.Gessen finally contends that venue was improper in the Northern District of California and that the district court erred in not giving his requested venue instruction.[W]e conclude that murder-for-hire may be charged as a continuing offense.Just as a kidnapping consists of “distinct parts” in “different localities” when a perpetrator moves their victim across state lines, so too does a murder-for-hire if the offender, for example, uses interstate-commerce facilities (with the requisite intent) on more than one occasion. Similarly, the victim of a murder-for-hire is not safe until the plan is foiled or the culprits arrested. So until that point, each act of travel or use of interstate commerce facilities in furtherance of the plot continues the criminal offense. Put another way, the offense “does not terminate merely because all of the elements are met.”In sum, murder-for-hire may be charged as a continuing offense. And the grand jury so charged Gessen. Thus, “venue lies in any district touched by the crime before the crime is completed.”Gessen recognizes that “the charged offense ‘was begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)). But he contends that he could not be tried in the Northern District of California because his offense was complete before any acts occurred in the district.The district court made no instructional error as to venue. So we will not disturb Gessen’s conviction on this ground.Gessen also presses that the government presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find proper venue in the Northern District of California.Gessen’s use of interstate commerce facilities to wire money to San Francisco, in furtherance of the murder-for-hire plot, subjects him to prosecution where that money was received: San Francisco. Because San Francisco is within the Northern District of California, venue was proper in the Northern District.
