In United States v. Cisneros, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-6774 (9th Cir. 2026), the majority affirmed a sentence imposed on Felix Cisneros, Jr., a former special agent for the Department of Homeland Security, who was convicted of taking bribes in exchange for misusing a confidential law enforcement database to help criminals and fraudulently attempting to bring an inadmissible noncitizen into the country through immigration parole.
The issue was whether the district court erred in relying on the Guidelines' commentary to impose an enhancement under § 2C1.1(b)(3) for a bribery offense that “involved an elected public official or any public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.”
Application Note 4(A) to § 2C1.1 defines “high-level decision-making or sensitive position” as “a position characterized by a direct authority to make decisions for, or on behalf of, a government department, agency, or other government entity, or by a substantial influence over the decision-making process.” Then, Application Note 4(B) provides examples of a “high-level decision-making position” and, separately, examples of a “sensitive position.” The examples of a “sensitive position” include “a juror, a law enforcement officer, an election official, and any other similarly situated individual.”
Cisneros was a law enforcement officer. So, if the district court properly deferred to Application Note 4, then it correctly determined that the enhancement applied. The majority held that it did:
We may not defer to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines unless the guideline itself is genuinely ambiguous. United States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2023). Before concluding that the guideline is genuinely ambiguous, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.Ambiguity alone does not warrant deference. The agency’s interpretation must be reasonable, which means it “come[s] within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after employing all its interpretive tools.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 575–76. And the “character and context of the agency’s interpretation” must “entitle[] it to controlling weight,” which it does if “(i) the interpretation is the agency’s official position, rather than any more ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s views; (ii) the interpretation implicates the agency’s substantive expertise; and (iii) the interpretation reflects the agency’s fair and considered judgment.”We hold that U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3)’s text is ambiguous as to whether the enhancement applies only to a “sensitive position” that is also “high-level,” that the term “sensitive position” is ambiguous, and that on both questions Application Note 4 warrants deference because it reasonably interprets the guideline. Because Cisneros, as a law enforcement officer, held a “sensitive position” identified in Application Note 4(B), the district court did not err in applying the enhancement.With two semantically and grammatically plausible readings, we conclude that the guideline is genuinely ambiguous as to whether a “sensitive position” must be “high-level” for the enhancement to apply. See Castillo, 69 F.4th at 655–56. We therefore turn next to the commentary.Application Note 4(B) to § 2C1.1 provides separate examples of a “high-level decision-making position” and of a “sensitive position.” This structure shows that the Commission did not intend “high-level” to modify “sensitive position.” Because this reading is consistent with both grammatical rules we reviewed above, we defer to it as a reasonable interpretation within the guideline’s zone of ambiguity. Cisneros need not have held a “high-level” position for the enhancement to apply.[A]fter carefully considering the parties’ arguments and the tools of construction, we agree with our colleague on the district court that the term “sensitive position” as used in § 2C1.1(b)(3) is genuinely ambiguous.Having found the guideline ambiguous, we may now turn, as the district court did, to the commentary. Application Note 4 warrants deference so long as it provides a reasonable construction of the guideline. Castillo, 69 F.4th at 655–56. We conclude that it does.Even if rank-and-file law enforcement officers do not make the final decisions on some matters, they still have “substantial influence over the decision-making process.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n.4(A) (defining the umbrella term “high-level decision-making or sensitive position”). Thus, the zone of ambiguity of the term “sensitive position” comfortably includes sworn law enforcement officers entitled to make arrests. Cisneros had arrest authority, which would be enough on its own for a “sensitive” position. See id. at 83. He also could initiate immigration parole requests, an authority he was convicted in this case of misusing. Accordingly, Application Note 4 is a reasonable interpretation of § 2C1.1(b)(3) as applied to Cisneros. The district court did not err in applying the enhancement.
Interestingly, Judge Rawinson's dissent is not about the merits. Instead, she dissented "because this opinion essentially endorses the district court's cavalier disregard of our mandate. A mandate from this court is not a suggestion or a recommendation. Rather, it is a command to the district court to perform a specific task or take a particular action. Indeed, the proper resolution for the failure of a district court to follow our mandate, is a remand for the district court to comply."
Whether I agree or disagree with the analysis conducted by the majority, or whether I conclude that the majority employed all available interpretive tools is not the point. The point is that we should not be conducting this analysis in the first instance, especially after we directed the district court to first perform the analysis. As noted on many occasions, "we are a court of review, not of first view."
