In United States v. Justus, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-1641 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court affirmed Robert Alvin Justus, Jr.’s convictions for aiding and abetting the murder of a person assisting a federal officer and aiding and abetting attempted murder of a person assisting a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1114(3), 1111, and 1112.
During a Goerge Floyd protest in 2020, Justus drove a van while Steven Carrillo fired nineteen rounds from an assault rifle at two Protective Security Officers on duty at a federal courthouse. One officer died, and the other was permanently disabled.
At trial, the government presented 73 exhibits from Justus’s social media activity to support its theory that Justus and Carrillo pre-planned the attack as part of their anti-government ideology.
Prior to trial, the district court reviewed each piece of social media evidence and extensively questioned the government on its intended use. On appeal, Justus argued that the district court erred in admitting this social media evidence because it was irrelevant, constituted improper character evidence, and was highly prejudicial.
The Court also discussed and rejected several other arguments.We conclude that Justus’s social media posts and communications were relevant to the crime charged. First, Justus’s advocacy for violence and physical attacks of law enforcement and the courts made it more probable that he intentionally aided Carrillo in the shooting of the officers. Second, the posts in which Justus used “Boogaloo” language supported the government’s theory that Justus participated in the attack to further the Boogaloo movement."Because the social media evidence tended to make Justus’s intent to commit the crime more probable, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence relevant and admissible under Rule 401."Justus also argues that the social media posts constituted improper character evidence because the government used the evidence to “inform the jury of Justus’s ‘beliefs.’” See Fed. R. Evid. 404.The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence was not impermissible character evidence because it established Justus’s growing animosity toward the federal government and desire to commit violence against government actors, and not a specific character trait or criminal propensity. Further, the evidence was not offered to establish that Justus acted in accordance with a specific character trait.Although the district court did not explicitly discuss Rule 403 in its written order regarding the social media evidence, the record shows that it engaged in this analysis. The district court extensively reviewed the probative value of the evidence in the context of the parties’ Rule 403-related arguments and explicitly acknowledged Justus’s argument that the evidence “would be unfairly prejudicial if admitted” when making its ruling. Further, the district court referenced Rule 403 in its written order on the other motions in limine. Finally, the court explicitly weighed the probative value and prejudice of similar evidence found on Justus’s phone during trial. Thus, the record clearly shows that the district court considered the potential prejudice of the social media evidence and implicitly conducted a Rule 403 analysis.Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the social media evidence under Rule 403. The government admitted seventy-three posts and conversations, but they were not redundant. Many of the posts focused on separate issues related to Justus’s intent, including his involvement with the Boogaloo movement, his desire to harm government officials and the courts, and his intent to take specific action and make or use weapons. Additionally, the numerous posts supported the government’s theory that Justus’s statements and animosity toward law enforcement escalated over time. The evidence was therefore relevant and admissible.
