In United States v. Bradford, --- F.4th ---, No. 23-4111 (9th Cir. 2025), the Court affirmed Donavin Dwayne Bradford’s conviction and sentence for multiple crimes related to sex trafficking several victims, including minors.
A duplicitous indictment can result in numerous “vice[s].” United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 116–17 (3d Cir. 1975). For example, if an indictment contains a duplicitous count, then “a general verdict for a defendant on that count does not reveal whether the jury found him not guilty of one crime or not guilty of both,” and such an outcome “could prejudice the defendant in protecting himself against double jeopardy.” Id. at 116. Conversely, “a general verdict of guilty does not disclose whether the jury found the defendant guilty of one crime or of both,” which “could prejudice the defendant in sentencing and in obtaining appellate review.” Id. “Duplicity may also give rise to problems regarding the admissibility of evidence, including its admissibility against one or more codefendants.” UCO Oil, 546 F.2d at 835. And further, “there is no way of knowing with a general verdict on two separate offenses joined in a single count whether the jury was unanimous with respect to either.” Starks, 515 F.2d at 117.Here, Bradford argues that Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding indictment were duplicitous because, in addition to charging him with violating § 1591 by sex trafficking a minor according to the statute’s lengthy list of other verbs,3 they also charged him with violating § 1591 by advertising—something that he argues is a separate crime prohibited by the same statute. Bradford argues that, consequently, he may have been subjected to several of the vices of duplicity.We reject Bradford’s arguments because § 1591 does not proscribe sex trafficking a minor via advertising as a separate and distinct crime; therefore, neither count in the superseding indictment is duplicitous and Bradford was not deprived of any defense.[C]ase law does not support Bradford’s broad argument that a statute that includes multiple scienter requirements always establishes multiple crimes.Because sex trafficking a minor by advertising the minor for commercial sex with the knowledge that the minor is under the age of eighteen is merely an alternate means by which a defendant can violate § 1591, the statute defines only one offense. We hold that Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding indictment are not duplicitous.We hold that sex trafficking a minor by advertising is not a separate and distinct crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1591; rather, it is one of the various means by which the statute can be violated. Therefore, Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding indictment are not duplicitous. We also hold that Bradford failed to show procedural or substantive error in his sentence.
