In United States v. Pheasant, --- F.4th ---, No. 23-911 (9th Cir. 2025), on the government's appeal, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of a count charging Gregory W. Pheasant with driving an offroad vehicle on public lands at night without a tail light, in violation of 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5), and remanded.
The Secretary of the Interior adopted section 8341.1(f)(5) under the authority vested in him by section 303(a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which directs the Secretary to “issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of [the FLPMA] with respect to the management, use, and protection of the public lands, including the property located thereon.” The statute provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully violates any such regulation which is lawfully issued pursuant to this Act shall be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned no more than twelve months, or both.”
The district court held that section 303(a) is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it gives the Secretary “unfettered legislative authority” to make rules that “cover almost all conduct on public lands” without “any guidance or restraint as to when the Secretary . . . shall promulgate rules.”
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It explained that under the Supreme Court’s “intelligible principle” test, a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform. The Court held that section 303(a) easily satisfies the “intelligible principle” test because, taken together, the FLPMA’s provisions set out a clear principle: The Secretary must develop a long-term management strategy to realize the land’s value in a sustainable way. Such constraints are enough to satisfy Article I.
