In United States v. Terabelian, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-50291 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court dismissed under the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine Marietta Terabelian’s appeal in a case in which Terabelian removed her location-monitoring device and fled to Montenegro while awaiting sentencing.
She was sentenced in absentia and counsel filed the appeal while she was a fugitive. Although she was returned to custody during the pendency of the appeal, the Court concluded that, on balance, the policy rationales underlying the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine weigh in favor of its application. Specifically, deterrence, the dignity of the courts, and the efficiency of the appellate process all support dismissal of the appeal.
The Court also explained that even if it had not dismissed the appeal, it would have rejected Terabelian’s claims on the merits.
One other note: The opinion contains some discussion of Kastigar hearings: "If a defendant’s statements were compelled in violation of the [F]ifth [A]mendment, he is entitled to a Kastigar hearing, in which the government must demonstrate that the evidence it intends to introduce in a subsequent criminal proceeding is not tainted by exposure to the compelled statements."
Next, in United States v. Sandeen, --- F.4th ---, No. 22-10003 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court dismissed an appeal to the extent it attacked the superseding indictment, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects in a case in which Andrew Sandeen’s plea agreement reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions but otherwise waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
The main issue was whether the return of an indictment by an expired grand jury is a jurisdictional defect that may be raised by a defendant on appeal notwithstanding an enforceable appeal waiver in a plea agreement. The Court overruled its prior precedent on this issue based on intervening Supreme Court law and held that it is not a jurisdictional defect that can be raised over a valid appellate waiver.
The Court also rejected on the merits Sandeen's suppression claims, which had been preserved by his conditional guilty plea.
Finally, in United States v. Stackhouse, --- F.4th ---, No. 22-30177 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court affirmed Angelo Corey Stackhouse’s convictions for kidnapping a minor using a means or instrumentality of intrastate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1201(g), and 3559(f)(2), and transportation of a person across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a).
Rejecting Stackhouse’s argument that his kidnapping conviction violates the Commerce Clause, the panel held that the application of the federal kidnapping statute, § 1201(a), to an intrastate kidnapping is constitutional where the defendant uses a cellphone—an instrumentality of interstate commerce—in furtherance of the offense.
The Court further held that the government presented sufficient evidence of Stackhouse’s contingent intent to commit sexual assault when he transported the victim of his assault across state lines in violation of § 2421. "[T]he fact Stackhouse may not have had an unconditional intent to commit sexual assault when he drove Hannah to Colorado does not undermine a finding of intent under § 2421."
"In sum, that Stackhouse may have intended to assault Hannah contingently—if the victim did not fully comply with his demands—is sufficient to meet the intent element of § 2421. Combining the adequacy of contingent intent with the evidence the government introduced—establishing Stackhouse’s pattern of assaultive behavior and prior interactions with other women, as well as his behavior leading up to and during his second trip to Denver with Hannah—there was sufficient evidence to convict Stackhouse of the § 2421 violation."
