In United States v. Eckford, --- F.4th ---, No. 17-50167 (9th Cir. 2023), the Court affirmed Leon Eckford’s conviction and sentence.
It held that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence that properly served as a predicate for Eckford’s conviction and mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
The Court concluded that its prior precedent on the issue was not clearly irreconcilable with, and thus not overruled by, United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence.
In United States v. Sadler, --- F.4th --- No. 21-30277 (9th Cir. 2023), the Court affirmed the sentence imposed on Jason Sadler following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
"After pleading guilty to a single count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Defendant Jason Sadler argued at his sentencing that the district court should not consider certain prior convictions in determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. According to Sadler, subsequent case authority made clear that the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions constitutionally invalid. We hold that the district court properly refused to entertain such a collateral challenge to a prior conviction in the context of this federal sentencing proceeding, and that those prior convictions were therefore properly considered in determining Sadler’s sentence. We therefore affirm Sadler’s sentence."
There is also a good footnote about mootness:
The Government has suggested in a post-argument filing that Sadler’s challenge to his underlying sentence is moot. The Government notes that, earlier in 2023, Sadler’s supervised release was revoked twice, and in connection with the second such revocation Sadler is now serving a 140-day term of imprisonment to be followed by a new 24-month term of supervised release. As a result, the Government argues, Sadler “is no longer serving” the sentence “that is the subject of this appeal,” and any error in calculating his original sentence “would thus not affect the sentence he is now serving.” We conclude that the Government—which has cited no authority that would support this mootness argument—has failed to carry its burden to show that the case is moot. “[B]ecause district courts have broad discretion to modify conditions of supervised release” under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2014), there is a possibility that the district court could reduce or modify Sadler’s supervised release terms in light of a correction of the calculation of the sentencing range. This ‘“possibility of the court’s reducing or modifying [Sadler’s] supervised release’ satisfies the case or controversy requirement.” United States v. D.M., 869 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, Sadler’s appeal is not moot.
