On appeal, the defendants challenged the district court’s refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction with respect to the means by which they obtained forced labor.
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit explained: "Calling a particular part of a statute an 'element' as opposed to a “means,” is legally significant. Relevant here, 'a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element.' However, 'a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.' Thus, the United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the legal elements of a crime and the factual means by which a defendant may commit that crime."
The Court continued, "the question in this case is: Are the listed alternatives in the forced labor statute elements or means? We hold that the listed alternatives of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) are factual means, rather than distinct legal elements. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendants’ proposed specific unanimity instruction."
