In United States v. Minasyan, --- F.3d ---, No. 19-50185 (9th Cir. 2021), the Court affirmed the conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit health care fraud.
Minasyan entered into a plea agreement in which he waived the right to appeal his conviction except on the ground that his plea was involuntary, and waived the right to appeal most aspects of his sentence if the district court determined that the offense level was no greater than 25.
On appeal, he argued the plea was involuntary because the district court did not give him a full and fair opportunity to contest the loss amount at his sentencing hearing. He also claimed his plea was involuntary because—in light of United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2020)—the plea agreement improperly stated the elements of the offense by stating that the requisite intent for the defendant’s offense was “to deceive or cheat,” instead of “to deceive and cheat.” Finally, he argued the appellate waiver was unenforceable because the government breached the plea agreement by attempting to influence the court to give a higher sentence than the prosecutor’s recommendation.
The Court rejected all of these claims: "We hold that Minasyan’s appeal waiver is enforceable. In so holding, we reject Minasyan’s contentions that (1) the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, either by reason of the district court’s sentencing procedure or its misstatement of the intent element during the plea colloquy; and (2) the government implicitly breached the plea agreement. Because Minasyan’s appeal waiver is enforceable and the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, we affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence."
Of further note, the Court explained: "We conclude that Minasyan had a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Contrary to Minasyan’s contention, the sentencing hearing also conformed to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. Rule 32(i)(1)(C) provides that the district court 'must allow the parties’ attorneys to comment on the probation officer’s determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence.' Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(C). But Rule 32(i)(2) also states that the district court 'may permit the parties to introduce evidence' on objections to the PSR. Id. at 32(i)(2) (emphasis added). While the district court was required to allow Minasyan to challenge the probation office’s findings on intended loss, the district court had discretion to determine whether presenting evidence to support the challenge would be helpful or necessary."
