In United States v. Melgar-Diaz, --- F.3d ---, No. 20-50010 (9th Cir. 2021), the Court affirmed misdemeanor convictions for entering the United States from Mexico at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).
The Court held that § 1325(a) does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power.
It explained: "Defendants interpret § 1325(a)(1) to permit any immigration officer, with no governing standards, to designate the times and locations when aliens may lawfully enter the United States. In their view, it is the immigration officers’ choice of where to place the legal points of entry that creates the crime. That choice, they claim, lacks any guiding principle because nothing would prevent immigration officers from designating either all or none of the border as a permissible place of entry."
The Court concluded: "Defendants misperceive both the statute and the nondelegation question. Section 1325(a)(1) does not give immigration officials the power to create crimes. Congress instead penalized a particular type of conduct: it is a crime to enter the United States unless an alien presents himself for inspection at an approved time and place. Congress left for the Executive Branch merely the interstitial task of determining those times and places, substantially similar to a law that prohibited crossing the street outside a crosswalk but delegated the power to decide where on the streets the crosswalks should be striped. Congress conferring that type of ministerial authority in § 1325(a)(1) does not present a non-delegation concern."
The Court also rejected both facial and as-applied vagueness challenges to the statute.
