First, in United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, No. 20-50329 (9th Cir. 2021), the Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment based on an alleged speedy-trial act violation.
The Court explained: "After the Central District of California suspended jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, Olsen invoked, for the first time, his right to a speedy trial. Because jury trials were suspended, the government requested a continuance of Olsen’s trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)—the Speedy Trial Act’s 'ends of justice' provision. The district court denied the request and, ultimately, dismissed the charges against Olsen with prejudice, concluding that continuances under the ends of justice provision are appropriate only if holding a criminal jury trial would be impossible. Because the district court erred in its reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), we reverse with instructions to reinstate Olsen’s indictment, grant an appropriate ends of justice continuance, and set this case for trial."
"We are asked to provide guidance on the application of the Speedy Trial Act’s ends of justice provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), in the context of the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic."
"It is true 'that the ends of justice exclusion . . . was intended by Congress to be rarely used, and that the provision is not a general exclusion for every delay.' But surely a global pandemic that has claimed more than half a million lives in this country, and nearly 60,000 in California alone, falls within such unique circumstances to permit a court to temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health."
Here is the Court's conclusion:
We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Olsen’s indictment. The district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act’s ends of justice provision—that continuances are appropriate only if holding a criminal jury trial would be impossible—was incorrect. Nothing in the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act or our precedents supports this rigid interpretation.
We are, however, mindful that the right to a speedy and public jury trial provided by the Sixth Amendment is among the most important protections guaranteed by our Constitution, and it is not one that may be cast aside in times of uncertainty.The Central District of California did not cast aside the Sixth Amendment when it entered its emergency orders suspending jury trials based on unprecedented public health and safety concerns. To the contrary, the orders make clear that the decision to pause jury trials and exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act was not made lightly. The orders acknowledge the importance of the right to a speedy and public trial both to criminal defendants and the broader public, and conclude that, considering the continued public health and safety issues posed by COVID-19, proceeding with such trials would risk the health and safety of those involved, including prospective jurors, defendants, attorneys, and court personnel. The pandemic is an extraordinary circumstance and reasonable minds may differ in how best to respond to it. The District Court here, however, simply misread the Speedy Trial Act’s ends of justice provision in dismissing Olsen’s indictment with prejudice.
Relatedly, in United States v. Torres, --- F.3d ---, No. 21-50006 (9th Cir. 2021), the Court considered "the limits that federal law and the Constitution place on holding an accused person in detention solely for the purpose of awaiting trial."
"Paul Francisco Torres III has been detained awaiting trial since August 26, 2019. His trial has been delayed and his detention prolonged as a result of the district court’s findings that the “ends of justice” served by avoiding the serious public health risks presented by holding a trial during the COVID-19 pandemic outweighed Torres’s right to a speedy trial. Torres now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for release from pretrial detention. Torres does not dispute that his trial was rightfully delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic pursuant to the ends-of-justice provision. Instead, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that because the ends of justice justified delaying his trial, the ends of justice necessarily justified prolonging his pretrial detention. According to Torres, a continuance that results in extending a defendant’s pretrial detention requires a 'significantly different' ends-of-justice analysis under the Speedy Trial Act. Alternatively, Torres asserts that due process mandates his release because the length of his pretrial detention exceeds the limits of what due process can tolerate."
"We hold that Torres’s pretrial detention is consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. This holding is two-fold. First, we conclude that because the plain text of § 3161(h)(7) requires consideration of the best interest of the defendant in a speedy trial, an ends-of-justice analysis will necessarily include consideration of whether the defendant is detained. Second, we conclude that § 3164(b) unambiguously provides that time properly excluded under § 3161(h) is properly excluded from § 3164. Because the record suggests that the district court considered Torres’s detention in granting the ends-of-justice continuances here, Torres’s pretrial detention was properly tolled under the Speedy Trial Act. We further conclude that due process does not yet require Torres’s release, but observe that the length of Torres’s pretrial detention is likely approaching the outer bounds of due process."
"It is undisputed that at some point, pretrial detention can 'become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive,' resulting in a due process violation."
"On balance, we conclude that Torres’s twenty-one-month detention does not yet violate due process, but we caution that the length of Torres’s detention is approaching the limits of what due process can tolerate. The length of Torres’s pretrial detention is significant under any metric and is deeply troubling. But the lack of any prosecutorial contribution to the delay and the strength of the evidence supporting Torres’s detention lead us to conclude that Torres’s detention is rationally connected to a regulatory purpose—preventing danger to the community and ensuring Torres will appear as required."
Again, here is the conclusion:
We affirm the district court’s conclusion that time properly excluded under the § 3161(h)(7)(A) ends-of-justice provision is expressly excluded from the ninety-day detention clock in § 3164 pursuant to § 3164(b). Because the ends-of-justice provision under § 3161(h)(7) requires consideration of the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial, a detained defendant’s status must be considered before a continuance of trial is granted. Accordingly, once a district court properly excludes time from the trial clock under the ends-of-justice provision, that exclusion applies to the detention clock as well. The plain language of § 3161(h)(7) and § 3164(b) support this conclusion.We also affirm the district court’s conclusion that Torres’s detention does not, at this time, violate due process. Our decision to uphold the district court’s ruling, however, is not made lightly. Because of the troubling length of Torres’s pretrial detention, due process demands that the district court begin Torres’s trial or reconsider bail subject to appropriate conditions very soon.
