"Kimbrew does not dispute that he took money in exchange for a promise that he made as a federal public official. He instead argues that he promised to do the impossible, so his conduct falls outside the purview of § 201 bribery.1 We are not persuaded, and we affirm."
Some important points about § 201 bribery.
- The statutory definition of “official act” contains broad temporal language that indicates the question or matter at issue need not currently be pending or capable of being brought before a public official.
- § 201 liability does not depend on an outcome; the offense is complete at the moment of agreement, and that agreement need not even be accompanied by the bribe recipient’s genuine intentions to follow through.
- Nowhere in the statute or in the governing case law is there a requirement that the bribe recipient be able to succeed in exerting that pressure or persuading through his advice to realize the desired result.
- The official can be convicted even if he never intended to perform the official act for which he was bribed. Id. at 2371. In short, execution is immaterial. It logically follows, then, that § 201 is not limited by the odds of success of the quo at issue.
- the “official act” core of § 201 carries with it a requirement that there be a nexus between the public official’s position and the quo he promises.
