The case is important because the Court found the district court erred in failing to make an explicit reliability finding before admitting the fingerprint analyst’s expert testimony under Daubert and Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Court, however, found the error harmless.
There is lots of good language to include when seeking a Daubert hearing:
The issue here is “reliability,” which requires that the expert’s testimony have “a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999)). The district court must assess whether “the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid” and “properly can be applied to the facts in issue,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93, with the goal of ensuring that the expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field,” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. “The test ‘is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but the soundness of his methodology,’ and when an expert meets the threshold established by Rule 702, the expert may testify and the fact finder decides how much weight to give that testimony.” Pyramid Techs., Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 752 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010)).
[D]istrict courts do not have “discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function” altogether, Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158–59 (Scalia, J., concurring), for “Rule 702 ‘clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify,’” Barabin, 740 F.3d at 464 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). We have thus held that a district court abuses its discretion when it either “abdicate[s] its role as gatekeeper” by failing to assess “the scientific validity or methodology of [an expert’s] proposed testimony,” or “delegate[s] that role to the jury” by “admitting the expert testimony without first finding it to be relevant and reliable.” Id.; see also City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the admission of an expert’s testimony without making “any findings regarding the efficacy of [the expert’s] opinions constituted an abdication of the district court’s gatekeeping role, and necessarily an abuse of discretion”).Second, in Prado v. Barr, --- F.3d ---, No 17-72914 (9th Cir. 2019) -- an immigration case -- the petitioner claimed her California felony conviction for possession of marijuana was no longer a predicate to removal because it was recalled and reclassified as a misdemeanor under California’s Proposition 64.
The Court rejected the argument, holding that valid state convictions retain their immigration consequences even when modified or expunged for reasons of state public policy. The Court concluded that Prop 64 "did not completely eliminate the consequences of the conviction under CHSC § 11359 even as a matter of state law; rather, it reclassified that conviction to a misdemeanor, under the modified terms of CHSC § 11359. Common sense and our precedent dictate that partial expungement or reclassification cannot eliminate the immigration consequences of a conviction."
Third, in United States v. Fultz, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-56002 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court denied a 2255 petition brought under Johnson:
The question presented is whether Robbery on a Government Reservation, 18 U.S.C. § 2111, is an elements clause “crime of violence,” that is, whether it is an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). We hold today that § 2111 Robbery is a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.
Because § 2119 Carjacking and § 2113 Bank Robbery, by means of “intimidation,” qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause after Johnson I, so too does § 2111 Robbery.Finally, in United States v. Orona, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-17508 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court granted the defendant's 2225 under Johnson. The Court held that, following Johnson, the defendant's 2007 conviction for aggravated assault under Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1203(A)(1) no longer qualified as a predicate felony under the ACCA. The Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Voisine did not overrule the en banc decision in Fernandez-Ruiz.
