The main issue on appeal centered on the statute's knowledge requirement: "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . knowingly engages in sexual contact with another person without that other person’s permission shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
The defendant argued the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he subjectively knew that his victim did not consent to the sexual contact. The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
We reject Price’s reading of the statute as contrary to its text, the structure of the statutory scheme and its very purpose in penalizing those who sexually prey upon victims on the seas or in the air within federal jurisdiction. Congress’s purpose in enacting the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 was to criminalize sexual contact by focusing on the defendant’s conduct. If the government were required to prove that the defendant subjectively knew he lacked consent, as Price urges here, every accused sexual predator could defend his admitted sexual contact in the face of no objective sign of permission by asserting a supposed subjective belief that the victim was “enjoying herself,” a result directly contrary to the purpose of the 1986 Act.
The Court held the government must prove the defendant knew he or she was engaging in sexual contact with the victim, and that the victim did not consent. But it did not need to prove the defendant subjectively knew about the lack of consent.
If you have a case about whether a mens rea term applies to different statutory elements, you should read this case.
