First, in United States v. Door, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-30165 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court addressed whether two Washington statutes -- felony harassment and second degree assault -- qualify as crimes of violence, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
The opinion has a thorough explanation of how the categorical analysis works differently with respect to the force clause, the enumerated offense clause, and the residual clause.
Based on prior precedent, the Court held that the conviction for felony harassment in
violation of Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) constitutes a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause of
§ 4B1.2(a)(1).
On the other hand, the conviction for second-degree assault in
violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(c) did not qualify as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause, or the residual clause.
Most noteworthy about this opinion is it limitation of United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.
2017), which held that Washington aiding an abetting was overbroad because it did not require specific intent. For a while, it looked like that holding would render all Washington crimes overbroad for federal sentencing-enhancement purposes, but today the Court limited Valdivia-Flores's holding to the enumerated clause. In other words, the aiding and abetting overbreadth applies to crimes falling within the enumerated clause but not others.
Frankly, this does not mesh with my understanding of categorical analysis, but I don't make the rules.
Second, in United States v. Pien-Pinto, --- F.3d ---, No. 18-30055 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court reaffirmed its holding that
the lack of a mens rea requirement in § 2K2.1(b)(4) (use of a stolen firearm in a crime) does not
violate due process. In doing so, it rejected a number of creative and compelling defense arguments.
