In United States v. Kirkland, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-10514 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court affirmed the defendant's convictions for being a felon in possession of a destructive
device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possessing
an unregistered destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d).
The case involved the definition of destructive device in 921(a)(4)(C): "any combination of parts either
designed or intended for use in
converting any device into any
destructive device described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) and from which
a destructive device may be readily
assembled."
The defendant argued that, because his device was missing the batteries needed to convert it into a functioning bomb, he was not guilty as a matter of law.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It held that § 921(a)(4)(C) requires only that the
defendant possess a combination of parts from which a
functional device “may be readily assembled”; that the
requirement does not categorically exclude situations in
which the assembly process entails the acquisition and
addition of a new part; and that the “readily assembled”
element can still be met so long as the defendant could
acquire the missing part quickly and easily, and so long as
the defendant could incorporate the missing part quickly and
easily.
Missing batteries was just such a situation, becuase they could be added easily. The Court further made clear the issue was one of fact for the jury. However, there was one exception: "the
defendant possesses the explosive material necessary to
construct an operable explosive weapon." In other words, if it had been the explosive material missing -- rather than the batteries -- the defendant's conviction would have failed.
