The Ninth published an opinion and an order today. Both cases involve federal prosecutions of law enforcement officers.
First, in United States v. Gonzalez, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-50483 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court affirmed the defendants' convictions and sentences. The case arose after Sheriff deputies beat a handcuffed man at the L.A. Jail. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to deprive the victim of his civil rights (18 U.S.C. § 241),
violating his civil rights (18 U.S.C. § 242), and falsifying
reports to obstruct an investigation (18 U.S.C. § 1519).
The opinion is long, covering a number of issues. But most interesting (at least for me) is the discussions of sufficiency challenges in the context of multiple-object conspiracies.
The Court rejected the argument "that whenever one object of a
multiple-object conspiracy is not supported by sufficient
evidence, a general verdict must be set aside."
It explained that, under Griffin v. United
States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), reversal is required "only if one of the objects of the
conspiracy is legally deficient—for example, because the
conduct underlying the object is protected by the
Constitution, occurred outside the statute of limitations, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime."
But "[t]he
rule is different when all objects of the conspiracy are sound
as a legal matter, but one of them lacks adequate evidentiary
support. Because “jurors are well equipped to analyze the
evidence,” we can be confident that the jury chose to rest its
verdict on the object that was supported by sufficient
evidence, rather than the object that was not. In this latter scenario, the verdict stands."
The Court found: "This case is controlled by Griffin. Gonzalez and Ayala do
not contend that either object of the conspiracy charged in
Count One was legally deficient. They do not, for example,
assert that the jury instructions improperly defined the
elements of the crime. They argue only that the first object,
concerning Carrillo’s right to be free from the use of
excessive force, was not supported by sufficient proof. Even
if we agreed with them on that point (which we don’t, for
reasons explained below), they would not be entitled to
reversal of their convictions on Count One."
There is lots more in the decision -- for example, a discussion of Pinkerton liability and causation requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 242. Worth a read.
Next, the saga of Joe Arpaio continues. For those who don't recall: "Arpaio violated an order of the district court. The United
States prosecuted Arpaio for criminal contempt of court and
obtained a conviction on July 31, 2017. President Trump
pardoned Arpaio on August 25, prior to sentencing by the
district court. Arpaio then moved to dismiss the prosecution
and to vacate the conviction. On October 19, 2017, the
district court granted Arpaio’s motion to dismiss the
prosecution but denied his motion to vacate the conviction.
Arpaio appealed the denial."
After the government indicated it would not defend the appeal, "a motions
panel of our court issued an order authorizing the
appointment of a special prosecutor to provide briefing and
argument to the merits panel” that will hear Arpaio’s appeal."
In United States v. Arpaio, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-10448 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court denied rehearing en banc of that order. There are concurrences and dissents, arguing about whether the special prosecutor is appropriate (as opposed to amicus). In any event, if you are interested in the law regarding a court's authority to appoint a special prosecutor, this one is for you.
