In United States v. Kechedzian, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-50326 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court vacated the defendant's conviction finding the district
court erred by failing to excuse a juror for cause under an
actual bias theory.
This is an important case to read, because the district court tried to rehab the juror. Here's the colloquy:
THE COURT: “[D]oes anyone feel, just
based on the charges in this case, based on what this case is
about, that they could not be fair and impartial to both sides?
Does anyone feel that way at this point in time?”
JUROR # 3: Yes. . . . [A]bout five
years ago I had . . . my
social security number
[stolen.] . . . I might be
able to put that aside and
just go by what I hear here
in the courtroom.
THE COURT: “Might” is a significant
word. Let’s follow up with
it a little bit. Obviously you couldn’t be a juror on
the person who stole your
identity and social
security card. You’d be a
bit upset—
JUROR # 3: Absolutely not.
THE COURT: You would be quite upset
about that. But I guess the
question becomes not just
maybe. We need to know
whether or not you are
going to decide this case
based on what happened
to you and your social
security number. What do
you think?
JUROR # 3: Well, I would want to put
my personal stuff aside,
but I honestly don’t know
if I could.
THE COURT: So will you tell us if you
can’t, if all of a sudden
you go through this case
and you say you know
what? My social security
number is popping up in
my head, and I’m going to
decide this case based on
what happened to me?
Would you tell us that?
JUROR # 3: No, I would try to be fair
. . . and put my personal
experience aside.
THE COURT: But if it turns out you’re
going through this process
and you feel you can’t—
it’s not working, would
you tell us?
JUROR # 3: Yes, I would.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
The Ninth Circuit held this was not sufficient: "at bottom, Juror # 3’s statements do
not provide any assurance that she was, or could have been,
impartial."
Next in United States v. Peterson, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-30084 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress but reversed his sentence.
As to the motion to suppress, the issue revolved around the alleged inevitable discovery of a gun in the defendant's backpack. The Court assumed the search was not a valid search incident to arrest, but concluded the gun would have been discovered:
"Because the officers
would have booked Peterson on obstruction or resisting
arrest charges absent discovery of the gun, and because bail
had not yet been set on those charges, Peterson would have
been taken into custody upon booking. The evidence demonstrates that it is standard procedure to inventory a
defendant’s possessions at the time of booking if the King
County jail will not accept the item and the arrestee will be
taken into custody."
In other words, the Court concluded an inventory search was inevitable.
As to the sentence, the Court held that Washington first-degree robbery (§ 9A.56.190) is not a crime of violence
under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4B1.2. Specifically, because Washington robbery
encompasses threats to property, it does not fall categorically
within generic robbery. Further, the Washington robbery statute is not a categorical match for extortion because it allows for a conviction to rest on fear of injury to
property alone.
