The issues on appeal were the need for a specific unanimity instruction and constructive amendment.
First, the Court held the district court properly declined to give a specific unanimity instruction as to whether the defendant used force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion. The Court held that, because these are "means" of committing the crime, not distinct "elements" of the crime, unanimity was not required.
The Court explained, "[i]n line with the general unanimity instruction, the jurors unanimously agreed that [defendant] knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that 'any combination of such means' of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion would be used to traffic [the victim]. The jury did not need to 'unanimously agree on a [more] specific classification of [the defendant's] conduct.'"
First, the Court held the district court properly declined to give a specific unanimity instruction as to whether the defendant used force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion. The Court held that, because these are "means" of committing the crime, not distinct "elements" of the crime, unanimity was not required.
The Court explained, "[i]n line with the general unanimity instruction, the jurors unanimously agreed that [defendant] knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that 'any combination of such means' of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion would be used to traffic [the victim]. The jury did not need to 'unanimously agree on a [more] specific classification of [the defendant's] conduct.'"
Interestingly, the Court faulted the government for introducing "considerable, and unnecessary, risk of error by asking the jury to decide which means [the defendant] used to traffic his victims."
"The important lessons from this case are that the prosecution is required to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt— without a requirement to subdivide the inquiry to the atomic level—and that jury instructions should not only match the statutory language but should be internally consistent."
Second, under the facts, the Court determined that the inclusion of the statutory phrase "or any combination of such means" in the jury instructions and Special Verdict Form did not constitute a constructive amendment even though the phrase was omitted from the operative indictment.
"The important lessons from this case are that the prosecution is required to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt— without a requirement to subdivide the inquiry to the atomic level—and that jury instructions should not only match the statutory language but should be internally consistent."
Second, under the facts, the Court determined that the inclusion of the statutory phrase "or any combination of such means" in the jury instructions and Special Verdict Form did not constitute a constructive amendment even though the phrase was omitted from the operative indictment.
