I will touch on each of the decisions, but let's begin with and focus on Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ---, No. 16-1371 (2018). In Byrd, the "Court granted certiorari to address the question whether a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car when he or she is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement."
The Court held that, "as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver." However, it remanded for further proceedings to determine: (1) whether, "in the circumstances here, Byrd had no greater expectation of privacy than a car thief. If that is so, our cases make clear he would lack a legitimate expectation of privacy;" and (2) "whether, even if Byrd had a right to object to the search, probable cause justified it in any event."
Of note, the Court decided the case under the Katz (reasonable expectation of privacy) rubric. It decided not to consider the defendant's common-law property interest claim, because it was not raised below.
Perhaps the most far-reaching impact of the opinion is its rejection of the argument that a boilerplate rental agreement controls the expectation-of-privacy inquiry: "True, this constitutes a breach of the rental agreement, and perhaps a serious one, but the Government fails to explain what bearing this breach of contract, standing alone, has on expectations of privacy in the car."
This part of the analysis will likely be applied to other private agreements, such as terms of service agreements for Google or FaceBook.
Beyond this issue, the Court also reminds us: "The concept of standing in Fourth Amendment cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search; but it should not be confused with Article III standing, which is jurisdictional and must be assessed before reaching the merits. Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim."
Moving on.
In United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ---, No. 17-312 (2018), the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision striking down as unconstitutional the Southern District's policy on pre-trial shackling of defendants. The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits. Instead, it found the case was moot because "before the [Ninth Circuit] court could issue a decision, [the defendant's] underlying criminal cases came to an end."
So, is there any way to challenge the shackling policy? According to the opinion: "None of this is to say that those who wish to challenge the use of full physical restraints in the Southern District lack any avenue for relief. In the course of this litigation the parties have touched upon several possible options. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 12 (indicating circumstances under which detainees could bring a civil suit). Because we hold this case moot, we take no position on the question."
Next, in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ---, No. 16-8255 (2018), the Court held that, in a capital case, "a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Guaranteeing a defendant the right 'to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence,' the Sixth Amendment so demands. With individual liberty—and, in capital cases, life—at stake, it is the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Court further held that a violation of this right is structural error requiring reversal.
In Dahda v. United States, 584 U.S. ---, No. 17-43 (2018), the Court considered whether a wiretap order that authorized interception beyond the District Court’s territorial jurisdiction rendered the order “insufficient on its face,” such that suppression was required under 18 U.S.C. §2518(10)(a)(ii). The Court noted that none of the communications unlawfully intercepted outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction were introduced at trial. Moreover, the remainder of the order was itself legally sufficient. Thus, the Court held the wiretap order was not “insufficient” on its “face.”
In Dahda v. United States, 584 U.S. ---, No. 17-43 (2018), the Court considered whether a wiretap order that authorized interception beyond the District Court’s territorial jurisdiction rendered the order “insufficient on its face,” such that suppression was required under 18 U.S.C. §2518(10)(a)(ii). The Court noted that none of the communications unlawfully intercepted outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction were introduced at trial. Moreover, the remainder of the order was itself legally sufficient. Thus, the Court held the wiretap order was not “insufficient” on its “face.”
Finally, in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn, 584 U.S. ---, No. 16-476 (2018), the Court found unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, which generally makes it unlawful for a State to “authorize” sports gambling schemes. 28 U. S. C. §3702(1).
"The PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do."
