In United States v. Cambell, --- F.3d ---, No. 17-50140 (9th Cir. 2017), the Court considered the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which extends the power to revoke a term of supervised release even after the term has expired.
In its words, "we must consider, as a matter of first impression in this circuit, the parameters of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which extends the power of a court to revoke a term of supervised release even after the term has expired. More specifically, we must settle whether a court may base a revocation upon violations which (1) were not alleged prior to the expiration of the supervision period, and (2) are not otherwise factually related to any matter raised before the court during the supervision period. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that district courts are not so empowered."
"we must decide the outer-limits of a court’s extended revocation power under § 3583(i) with respect to post-supervision allegations which are factually unrelated to matters raised during a defendant’s term of supervision. As to this issue, we are not convinced by the government’s arguments concerning the relevance of the statutory text “such a violation.”
The Court found congressional "intent to limit the universe of violations alleged post-expiration which a court is empowered to adjudicate under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) to only those which are factually related to matters raised in a signed warrant or summons issued before expiration."
In short, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) does not empower a district court to base a revocation upon violations which (1) were not alleged prior to the expiration period and (2) are not otherwise factually related to a matter raised in a signed warrant or summons issued before expiration.
In United States v. Evans, --- F.3d ---, No. 16-10310 (9th Cir. 2018), the most salient part is that the Court struck down several standard conditions of supervised release as unconstitutionally vague.
Specifically, the Court remanded for the district court to: (a) remove the phrase “meet other family responsibilities” from Standard Condition 4, (b) remove an ambiguity in Standard Condition 5, which requires the defendant to work “regularly” at a lawful occupation, and (c) amend Condition 13 – which requires the defendant, as directed by the probation officer, to notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by his criminal record or personal history or characteristics – in order to provide some determinate guidance to the defendant’s probation officer, as well as to the defendant.
Although these conditions have been amended by the Sentencing Commission, the opinion is still worth reading.
