The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard in excluding evidence of third-party culpability. To that end, the Court reiterated: “[f]undamental standards of relevancy, subject to the discretion of the court to exclude cumulative evidence and to insure orderly presentation of a case, require the admission of testimony which tends to prove that a person other than the defendant committed the crime that is charged.”
Thus, "all evidence of third-party culpability that is relevant is admissible, unless barred by another evidentiary rule." The district court, however, excluded otherwise relevant third-part evidence because it was not "coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense." Because this was the wrong standard, the district court necessarily abused its discretion.
There is a very helpful discussion on admitting conviction records of allegedly guilty third parties. The Court held such documents should not be excluded under Rule 404(b) because they "were relevant to establishing the [third] knowledge and ability."
The Court, however, "caution[ed] that our ruling that the conviction documents were admissible here is not transferable to a situation in which the government seeks to introduce similar evidence with respect to a defendant’s prior crimes under Rule 404(b). This is because “the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword.”
The Court noted, "[w]here, as here, the evidence is not introduced against a defendant, but rather is introduced by a defendant, the same protective concerns are not implicated."
The Court further explained, "[t]hat the defense’s theory may be speculative is not a valid reason to exclude evidence of third-party culpability."
In other news, the Court issued a new opinion in United States v. Kleinman, --- F.3d ---, No. 14-50585 (9th Cir. 2018). The new opinion reaches the same result as before (see below for my prior summary) but amends the discussion of jury nullification instructions.
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In United States v. Kleinman, --- F.3d ---, No. 14-50585 (9th Cir. 2017), the Court rejected the defendant's myriad arguments, and affirmed his convictions for for conspiracy to distribute and possess marijuana, distribution of marijuana, maintaining a drug-involved premises, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court also affirmed his 211-month sentence.
This case started as a California prosecution of defendants who ran several marijuana collectives in L.A. After the case was dismissed in state court, the feds picked up ball. One defendant went to trial. It did not end well.
On appeal, he challenged the prosecution, arguing the congressional prohibition on using federal funds to prosecute state medical marijuana operations should apply to his case.
Although the Court agreed the prohibition applied to the case, it did not help the defendant, because it only prohibited the expenditure of DOJ funds in connection with a specific charge involving conduct that is fully compliant with state laws regarding medical marijuana. Here, not all the charges qualified. And it did not require a court to vacate convictions that were obtained before the rider took effect (the circumstance here).
Of note, there is a relatively helpful discussion on jury instructions after a defendant makes a nullification argument. The Court held that the district court erred by instructing the jury that “[t]here is no such thing as valid jury nullification,” and that it “would violate [its] oath and the law if [it] willfully brought a verdict contrary to the law given to [it] in this case.” But the error was harmless.
There are other issues too. If you have a medical marijuana case, this decision is a must read.
