Wednesday, July 5, 2017

7/5/17: A death penalty reversal and a case on sentencing reductions

Two cases to discuss today. 

First, in Petrocelli v. Baker, --- F.3d ---, No. 14-99006 (9th Cir. 2017), the Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but vacated his death sentence.  

This is a pre-AEDPA case.  The petitioner was convicted of murder in Nevada.

In challenging his conviction, the petitioner raised a number of arguments about the use of his confessions and Miranda.  These were rejected.  Of note, there is some discussion of what constitutes and unambiguous invocation.  The panel also reminds us that, even if there is a Miranda violation, the statement can still be used for impeachment, so long as it was voluntary. 

As for the sentence, the petitioner argued the admission of psychiatric testimony during the penalty phase violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith.  

The psychiatrist, acting at the request of the prosecutor, visited the petitioner in jail to determine his competency to stand trial, failed to provide Miranda warnings, did not seek or obtain permission from appointed counsel to visit or evaluate him, and testified that the petitioner was a dangerous psychopath and incurable.  The prosecutor then highlighted this testimony in closing. 

The panel had no trouble finding a prejudicial, constitutional violation.  Judge Christen concurred to explain that "even if the State could show that the prosecutor’s tactics had not prejudiced the jury’s verdict, Petrocelli’s case is one of the very few in which deliberate prosecutorial misconduct and egregious trial errors warrant habeas relief. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993) (stating that a deliberate and especially egregious trial error, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might warrant habeas relief, even if the jury’s verdict is not substantially influenced)."

Moving on.

In United States v. Padilla-Diaz, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-30279 (9th Cir. 2017), the Court affirmed the district court’s denials of three defendants’ motions for sentence reductions under United States Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The appeal focused on the Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), which generally prohibits courts from reducing a defendant’s “term of imprisonment” to “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.”  

The Court held that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A): (1) was not inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (providing that one of the “purposes” of the Commission is to “establish sentencing policies and practices” that “avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors.”); (2) did not violate equal protection because it was rational; and (3) did not violate due process even though it was enacted after two of the defendants' guilty pleas.