In Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. ---(2017), the unanimous Court decided that, in sentencing a defendant who has
been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the district court can consider the
mandatory minimum for the 924(c) in determining the appropriate sentence for
the underlying predicate offense.
Section 924(c)
criminalizes using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of
such an underlying crime. It also mandates a distinct penalty, one that must be
imposed “in addition to the punishment provided for [the predicate] crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.” §924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A
first-time offender under §924(c) receives a five-year mandatory minimum. A
“second or subsequent conviction” under §924(c) carries an additional 25-year
mandatory minimum. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i),(C)(i).
The Court determined,
“[n]othing in §924(c) restricts the authority conferred on sentencing courts by
§3553(a) and the related provisions to consider a sentence imposed under
§924(c).”
It further
explained: “The Government speaks of Congress’s intent to prevent district
courts from bottoming out sentences for predicate §924(c) offenses whenever
they think a mandatory minimum under §924(c) is already punishment enough. But
no such intent finds expression in the language of §924(c). That language
simply requires any mandatory minimum under §924(c) to be imposed “in addition
to” the sentence for the predicate offense, and to run consecutively to that
sentence. Nothing in those requirements prevents a sentencing court from
considering a mandatory minimum under §924(c) when calculating an appropriate
sentence for the predicate offense.”
Moving on.
In United States v. Blackwell, --- F.3d---, Case No. 16-10287 (9th Cir. 2017), the Court held that, even for those
ordered to pay restitution before enactment of the “Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act of 1996,” the time limits in that Act apply. Thus, “the liability to pay a fine or
restitution shall terminate the later of 20 years from the entry of judgment or
20 years after the release from imprisonment of the defendant.”
