1/24/24: Expedited removals and acceptance of responsibility

In United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-50303 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court affirmed José Gambino-Ruiz’s conviction and sentence for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 in a case in which he argued (1) the removal order that served as the basis for that charge—an expedited removal—was improper under the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (2) the district judge considered impermissible factors in denying a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

In his collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), Gambino-Ruiz maintained that his 2013 removal violated his due process rights because he was not inadmissible on grounds that authorize expedited removal, and thus could not be placed in expedited removal proceedings.

In a complex opinion addressing the relevant statutory interplay and fictive legal states, the Court rejected his claim.  It is very hard to summarize the Court's analysis, so I'll just share its conclusion: 

We conclude that Gambino-Ruiz was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and therefore properly subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). The theory Gambino-Ruiz propounds overreads the significance of our decision in Torres and would “create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location.”  This was the precise situation that Congress intended to do away with by enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. We refuse to interpret the INA in a way that would in effect repeal that statutory fix. We hold that the government did not violate Gambino-Ruiz’s due process rights when it removed him via expedited proceedings in 2013. He was properly convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.

As to his argument for acceptance of responsibility after trial, the Court held: "Gambino-Ruiz has not persuaded us that his was the rare circumstance where the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is due after the defendant has proceeded to trial. Although he confessed his illegal status when he was most recently apprehended, he sought to suppress those inculpatory statements pre-trial. Apart from his pre-trial decisions, he continued to contest his guilt during trial by attempting to negate a key element of the offense, namely his alienage. His motive at trial was clearly beyond merely 'preserv[ing] issues that do not relate to factual guilt.' U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 2. We therefore affirm the district judge’s denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment and Gambino-Ruiz’s sentence."

1/17/24: Case on the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act

In United States v. Marin, --- F.4th ---, No. 22-50154 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, which prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel.

Defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing the provision under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because (1) Congress’s authority to “define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high Seas,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (the “Felonies Clause”), is limited by international law principles; and (2) § 70502(d)(1)(C), enacted under the Felonies Clause, conflicts with international law as to when a vessel may be treated as stateless. 

The Court did not decide the first issue, but held instead that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(C) does not conflict with international law. 

"Because there is no rule of international law speaking to this jurisdictional question, the United States does 'not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction,' in choosing to treat vessels as stateless where the claimed nation responds that it can neither confirm nor deny the registry. We therefore need not address defendants’ argument that Congress’s powers to enact laws pursuant to the Felonies Clause is constrained by international law to conclude that defendants’ challenge to § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA fails. We affirm defendants’ convictions." 

1/3/24: Miranda rights with administrative rights and the corpus delicti doctrine (illegal entry case)

In United States v. Gonzalez-Godinez, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-50031 (9th Cir. 2024), the Court affirmed Mario Gonzalez-Godinez’s conviction for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).

First, distinguishing the circumstances in United States v. San Juan-Cruz, 314 F.3d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 2002), the Court rejected Gonzalez's argument that the Miranda warning he received was inadequate because the agent also warned Gonzalez that the post-arrest interview may be his only chance to seek asylum. 

The Court held, "[w]hile these two warnings may have posed difficult decisions for Gonzalez, they are neither contradictory nor confusing. Criminal defendants often face a fork in the road with potential peril on either path. The record suggests that Gonzalez understood his rights, and Gonzalez’s gambit was to talk in hopes of seeking asylum, despite the risks. We thus hold that the government did not need to provide further clarification to the Miranda warnings."

Second, the Court also rejected Gonzalez's argument under the corpus delicti doctrine that the government failed to corroborate his confession that he was a Mexican citizen who lacked documentation.   The Court held, "the corpus delicti doctrine sets a low bar, requiring only some evidence to support the confession. Sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s confession."