9/23/22: Interesting case on Rule 41.

In United States v. Wright, --- F.4th ---, No. 19-10302 (9th Cir. 2022), the Court affirmed the district court’s orders with respect to Brian Wright’s claim in proceedings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) for the return of money seized from him in 2014 and 2017.  The Court held that neither Wright nor the government has established a right to the money.

"We hold that neither party has established its right to the money. Wright is correct that, as the person who last held the cash before it was seized, he was presumptively entitled to its return. But the district court properly found that this presumption was rebutted by the considerable evidence demonstrating that the money was stolen. We affirm the district court’s orders with respect to Wright’s claim to the money."

"At the same time, we hold that the government has not established its ownership of the money. Congress has enacted a detailed statutory forfeiture scheme through which the government may establish title in seized property. For reasons the government has struggled to articulate, it never invoked this scheme. We decline to permit the government to sidestep the forfeiture statutes, and their accompanying procedural protections, by way of a Rule 41(g) proceeding. Due to its various procedural errors, the government has not perfected title in the money and, unfortunately, Wright’s victims must continue to await compensation."

9/14/22: Very good compassionate release decision

In United States v. Chen, --- F.4th ---, No. 20-50333 (9th Cir. 2022), the Court vacated the district court’s denial of Howard Chen’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and remanded.

The issue was whether a district court may consider the First Step Act’s non-retroactive changes to sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The Court held that it could. 
 

"We now join the First, Fourth, and Tenth circuits and conclude that district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when analyzing extraordinary and compelling reasons for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A). There is no textual basis for precluding district courts from considering non-retroactive changes in sentencing law when determining what is extraordinary and compelling."

"To hold that district courts cannot consider non-retroactive changes in sentencing law would be to create a categorical bar against a particular factor, which Congress itself has not done. In fact, such a categorical bar would seemingly contravene the original intent behind the compassionate release statute, which was created to provide the “need for a ‘safety valve’ with respect to situations in which a defendant’s circumstances had changed such that the length of continued incarceration no longer remained equitable.”

"We instead follow our precedent in Aruda and allow district courts to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason a defendant might raise, including § 403(a)’s non-retroactive changes in sentencing law."

9/13/22: Two decisions today

In United States v. Fowler, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-30172 (9th Cir. 2022), the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Eric Fowler’s motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a traffic stop made by a Montana state trooper while Fowler, a member of an Indian tribe, was driving on a highway that runs through the Fort Peck Indian Reservation.

This case focuses on the cross-deputization agreement between the State of Montana and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation.  The Court held that the agreement was valid and thus so was the stop.   

In United States v. Montoya, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-50129 (9th Cir. 2022), the Court affirmed Montoya's conviction and sentence for importing cocaine and methamphetamine.

Montoya entered a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B).  On appeal, she argued that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).

The Court rejected this argument and a host of others.  It also reiterated that the district court need not orally pronounce conditions of supervised release that are mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) or recommended by the Guidelines as “standard, boilerplate conditions of supervised release.”

9/2/22: A published decision with no precedential force?

In United States v. Guerrero, --- F.4th ---, No. 21-10248 (9th Cir. 2022), a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sergio Guerrero’s motion to suppress.

There are two concurrences and a dissent, so this seems to be a mostly result only opinion.  

"We affirm the denial of Guerrero’s motion to suppress because of the consistent conclusions of Judge Gould and Judge Bea, representing a majority of the panel, that we should affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. Affirmance is required by the conclusions of the judges in the majority, even though the reasoning of Judge Gould and Judge Bea in their separate concurrences filed herewith is different."

As for the dissent, Judge Thomas persuasively argues: "Trooper Amick’s stop ripened into an arrest when he held Guerrero handcuffed, on a roadside, for approximately 40 minutes, waiting for federal officers to arrive. Trooper Amick had no probable cause to do so. Thus, I agree with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations, and would reverse the district court’s denial of the suppression motion."